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Abstract  
 
Most EU Member States have carried out substantial pension reforms over the last decades in order to 
enhance fiscal sustainability, while maintaining adequate pension income. The intensity of pension 
reforms has been particularly strong since 2000. These reforms have been implemented through a 
wide range of measures that have substantially modified the pension system rules and parameters. 
One of the most important elements of pension reforms, aside of whether countries engaged or not in 
a systemic change, has been the introduction of mechanisms aimed at automatically adjusting 
(indexing) the key pension parameters (pension age, benefits, financing resources) to demographic 
pressure (e.g. changes in life expectancy, increase in the dependency ratio). Indeed, since the mid-
1990's, half of the EU Member States have adopted either automatic balancing mechanisms, 
sustainability factors and / or automatic links between retirement age and life expectancy. All these 
pension reforms are projected to have a substantial impact on containing future pension expenditure 
trends. According to the latest long-term projections in the 2015 Ageing Report, public pension 
expenditure is projected to be close to 11% of GDP over the long run in the EU, almost the same as in 
2013.  
However, the fiscal impact of ageing is still projected to be substantial in many EU countries, 
becoming apparent already over the course of the next two decades. This is also due to the very 
gradual phasing in of already legislated reforms, an issue that raises questions about the 
intergenerational fairness of the reforms and poses some doubt on the time-consistency of their 
implementation. Indeed, the sustainability-enhancing pension reforms legislated in a majority of EU 
countries will lead to a reduction of generosity of public pension schemes for future generations of 
retirees. But to make sure that these reforms will not have to face political and social resistance and 
risk of reversal in the moment they start to be implemented in full, other "flanking"  policy measures 
are likely to be necessary: for example, reforms that boost retirement incomes by effectively 
extending working lives and employability of older workers (also through flexible working 
arrangements that allow people to keep working beyond current formal retirement age and to step 
down gradually from full-time to part-time to very part-time work) and provide other means of 
retirement incomes (e.g. private pensions) and appropriate social safety nets to avoid that people fall 
into poverty in old age. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Most EU Member States have carried out gradual and in some cases substantial pension reforms over 
the last decades in order to enhance fiscal sustainability, while maintaining adequate pension income. 
The intensity of pension reforms has been particularly strong since 2000. These reforms have been 
implemented through a wide-range of measures that have modified substantially the pension system 
rules and parameters (e. g. pension age, retirement incentives, pension calculation, indexation, social 
contributions). Pension reforms have generally been implemented only gradually and over long time 
periods. Several Member States have additionally adopted more systemic reforms, by strongly 
supporting the introduction of new pillars and / or radically changing the nature of their public pension 
schemes. Moreover, more than half of the EU Member States have now introduced automatic 
mechanisms, linking key pension system parameters to life expectancy.  
The great recession that hit the European Union in 2008-09 prompted in many countries an acceleration of 
sustainability-enhancing pension reforms, through the adoption of additional measures with sometimes 
short-term impacts. In some cases, partial or full reversals of past systemic reforms were observed. 
The projected low birth rates and expected continued increases in life expectancy will result in an 
almost unchanged, but much older, population by 2060. The EU is expected to move from having 
about four working-age people (aged 15-64) for every person aged over 65 to a ratio of only two to 
one. On account of the expected reduction of the working population in Europe, potential growth is 
likely to be much lower than experienced in previous decades, and the need for public provision of 
age-related transfers and services will at the same time increase.  
On the one hand, it should be acknowledged that there has been considerable progress with pension 
reforms. The improvements are already visible, for instance with regard to employment rates that have 
risen on account of pension reforms, especially among older workers. Moreover, pension reforms 
display a substantial impact on containing future pension expenditure trends. According to the latest 
long-term projections in the 2015 Ageing Report, public pension expenditure is projected to be close 
to 11% of GDP over the long run in the EU, almost the same as in 2013.  
On the other hand, the fiscal impact of ageing is still projected to be substantial in many EU countries, 
becoming apparent already over the course of the next decade, also because of the very gradual 
phasing in of already legislated reforms, an issue that raises questions about the intergenerational 
fairness of the reforms and poses some doubt on the time-consistency of their implementation. Indeed, 
the sustainability-enhancing pension reforms legislated in a majority of EU countries will lead to a 
reduction of generosity of public pension schemes for future generation of retirees. This has reduced 
the expenditure-increasing effects of demographic change in the long-term. But to make sure that 
these reforms will not have to face political and social resistance in the moment they start to be 
implemented in full, other reforms are likely to be necessary: for example, reforms that boost 
retirement incomes by effectively extending working lives and provide other means of retirement 
incomes (e.g. private pensions). Hence, more needs to be done in this respect.  
This paper draws heavily on the wealth of information contained in the five vintages of the joint EC 
(ECFIN) and EPC (AWG) Ageing Reports (published in 2001, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015). The 
paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 analyses the features of the pension reforms over the last 
decade. Chapter 3 assesses the budgetary savings resulting from the estimated impact of pension 
reforms, making use of the 5 vintages of long-term budgetary projections (released in 2001, 2006, 
2009, 2012 and 2015), carried out jointly by the Commission services (DG ECFIN) and the group of 
Member States' experts on ageing (the AWG, attached to the Economic Policy Committee).  Chapter 
four describes the impact of the reforms on the actuarial fairness, the financial sustainability and the 
adequacy of EU pension systems. The paper concludes by describing remaining challenges and policy 
options. 
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2. TRENDS IN PENSION REFORMS: AN AREA OF DECISIVE 
POLICY ACTION CHALLENGED BY THE 2008-09 
FINANCIAL CRISIS  
The age structure of the EU population is projected to dramatically change in the coming decades, due 
in particular to an increasing longevity and low fertility (see Graph 1). The demographic old-age 
dependency ratio (people aged 65 or above relative to those aged 15-64) is projected to increase from 
less than 25% in 2001 to around 50% in 2060 (according to the Ageing Report 2015 - see Graph 2). 
This long-term increase was even projected to be higher in the previous vintages of the Ageing Report 
(for example, + 25 pp. in 2001 - see Table 1). This population ageing trend poses important fiscal 
sustainability challenges in the medium and long term, as (all else being equal) larger cohorts of 
pensioners put pressures on public pension expenditures (the additional EU average spending - 
without taking into account other effects1 - due to the "ageing" effect has been estimated at around + 
7½ pp. of GDP in the long term in the different vintages of the Ageing Reports). 
Graph 1. Actual and projected life expectancy          Graph 2. Actual and projected old-age            
and fertility rate in the EU (2015 AR)                                dependency ratio in the EU (65+/ 15-64 –2015 AR) 
                                                                    
      
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
 
Table 1. Main demographic assumptions through the different AR vintages (EU average) 
 
* BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FI, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK 
** All MSs except EL, BG, RO & HR 
*** All MSs except HR 
Source: Ageing Report (2001 to 2015), Eurostat 
                                                            
1 This estimation corresponds to the change in public pension expenditure due to the dependency ratio component (holding 
constant other factors such as the coverage ratio, the benefit ratio or the labour market ratio i. e. not taking into account the 
impact of pension reforms, see section 3 of the paper).  
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In order to enhance fiscal sustainability, while maintaining adequate pension income, most EU 
Member States have carried gradual and substantial pension reforms over the last decades. 2 The 
intensity of pension reforms has been particularly strong since 2000 (see Graph 3). These reforms 
generally comprised a wide-range of measures (see Graph 4). Most European countries modified 
substantially their pension system rules and parameters (e. g. pension ages, retirement incentives, 
pension calculation, indexation, social contributions). Pension reforms are often implemented 
gradually over long time periods. Several Member States additionally adopted more systemic reforms, 
by strongly supporting the introduction of new pillars and / or radically changing the nature of their 
public pension schemes (see section 2.1.2). Moreover, the great recession that hit the European Union 
in 2008-09 prompted in many countries an acceleration of sustainability-enhancing pension reforms, 
through the adoption of additional measures, with sometimes short-term impacts. In some cases, 
partial or full reversals of past systemic reforms were also observed (see section 2.2).  
Graph 3. Number of (main) pension measures               Graph 4. Decomposition of (main) pension 
in the EU since the 1990's                                                    measures in the EU since the mid-2000's 
                                                                    
      
Source: Authors calculation based on the Ageing Report (2009, 2012, 2015), European Economy (2007), SPC 2015 
Report, OECD (2012, 2014, 2015). 
Notes: i) These figures are based on the main pension measures adopted by EU countries as reported in the 
different papers quoted (both for public and private pensions). They are not necessarily comprehensive and involve 
to some extent a subjective analysis. ii) Pensions measures have been decomposed in 5 broad categories: eligibility 
measures (e. g. pension ages, required contributory period), pension formula (e. g. definition of pensionable 
earnings, accrual rates, valorisation), indexation (for pensions in payment), resources (e. g. social contributions, 
taxes) and schemes (merge or closure of pension schemes). 
Based on the rich set of information contained in the five Ageing Reports published jointly by the 
European Commission (DG ECFIN) and the Economic Policy Committee, this chapter describes the 
main reforms in the EU over the last decade. Section 2.1.1 highlights the main overall trends in terms 
of parametric pension reforms, while section 2.1.2 focuses on a subset of countries, which additionally 
adopted more systemic reforms. While these first two sections put the emphasis on sustainability-
enhancing measures (that has been the main objective of pension reforms over the last decades3), 
section 2.1.3 provides a brief discussion of accompanying pension measures aimed at improving 
adequacy or further harmonising public pension schemes 4. 
                                                            
2 Projected increases in pension expenditure can pose significant challenges to fiscal sustainability. See Carone et al. (2014) 
for a coherent framework for assessing fiscal sustainability challenges.  
3 This is also the focus of this paper.  
4 See Table A.1 in the Annex for an overview of the main type of reforms adopted by country according to their intensity. 
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2.1. (PUBLIC) PENSION REFORMS: MAIN OVERALL TRENDS 
2.1.1. European countries substantially reformed their (public) pension system 
through a succession of parametric reform  
Increasing retirement ages 
Over the last decade(s), the most common measure adopted to address pension sustainability 
challenges in the EU has consisted of raising pension ages. Indeed, nearly all European countries have 
increased the level of early and statutory retirement ages (the only exception being Luxembourg). In 
some cases (e.g. Greece, Sweden, France and Finland), particularly large increases have been 
legislated between 2008 and 2013 (see below). Looking forward, according to the Ageing Report 
2015, only Luxembourg and Sweden have not legislated (further) rises of pension ages. Austria and 
Slovenia also project increases limited to women (in order to harmonise pension age between genders). 
The largest progression of statutory retirement age over the period 2008 – 2060 is projected in 
Denmark, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Slovakia (see Table 2). However, despite this 
common upward trend, an important dispersion of pension ages should remain in the long run: for 
example, in 2060, the statutory retirement age should be as high as 72.5 in Denmark (for both men and 
women) against 63 for women in Bulgaria (see Graphs 5 and 6).5 At this date, the norm in terms of 
statutory retirement age should be around 67 against 65 for men and 63 for women currently (see 
Table 2). Comparing the last two vintages of the Ageing Report (2012 and 2015), a significant upward 
revision (by close to one year) of the projected increase of the statutory retirement age can be observed 
(see Table 3).  
As the effective exit age from the labour market tends to be lower than the legal pension age, most 
Member States also introduced different measures in order to change the incentives to retire (with the 
effect of reducing relative pension benefits, see next sub-section): 
• Pathways to early retirement, many of which were introduced in the 1970's in response to 
rising unemployment (e.g. specific early retirement schemes, use of unemployment or 
sickness insurance schemes for older workers), have been closed to new entrants or severely 
restricted (including disability pensions) in most of European countries (e.g. Spain, France, 
Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Finland, Sweden);  
• Increases in the number of years of contributions required to receive a (full) pension have also 
been a frequent feature of pension reform packages (the average contributory period estimated 
at around 34 years on average at the EU level in 2014 is projected to increase by 4 years to 
around 38 years in 2060, according to the Ageing Report 2015);  
• The introduction of bonuses / penalties paid / imposed on people retiring after / before the 
normal pension age is frequently observed (such incentives currently exist in 18 EU countries 
- see Ageing Report 2015);  
• Easing of the conditions to cumulate pension and wage (e. g. Czech Republic, Spain, 
Romania). Some countries even abolished the notion of statutory retirement age (e.g. in 
Sweden, where the retirement age is flexible6, and in the UK, where the State pension age 
corresponds to the age after which a public pension can be received, whether or not the 
individual has retired).  
                                                            
5 The impact of the 2015 Bulgarian pension reform has not been taken into account in this paper. 
6 Although laws on employment protection stipulate that an individual is entitled to stay in employment until his / her 67th 
birthday, but not after that.  
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Table 2. Statutory and early retirement ages (in bracket) 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2009, 2015), updated for Belgium (November 2015) 
 
Notes: See the 2015 Ageing Report for additional information on these figures. Countries with a * have introduced an 
automatic link between the retirement age and life expectancy. The EU/EA figures are simple averages. 
 
Table 3. Projected change in the statutory retirement age in the EU: 2012 AR versus 2015 AR 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2012, 2015), updated for Belgium (November 2015) 
 
 
2008 2013 2020 2040 2060 2008 2013 2020 2040 2060
BE 65 65 (60.5) 65 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 64 65 (60.5) 65 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63)
BG 63 63.7 (63.7) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 59.5 60.7 (60.7) 62.7 (62.7) 63 (63) 63 (63)
CZ* 61.8 62.7 (59.7) 63.7 (60) 66.5 (61.5) 69.3 (64.3) 56-60 59.7 (56.7) 61.7 (58.7) 66.5 (61.5) 69.3 (64.3)
DK* 65 65 (60) 66 (63) 70 (67) 72.5 (69.5) 65 65 (60) 66 (63) 70 (67) 72.5 (69.5)
DE 65 65.3 (63) 65.8 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 65 65.3 (63) 65.8 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63)
EE 63 63 (60) 63.8 (60.8) 65 (62) 65 (62) 60.5 62 (59) 63.8 (60.8) 65 (62) 65 (62)
IE 65 65 (65) 66 (66) 68 (68) 68 (68) 65 65 (65) 66 (66) 68 (68) 68 (68)
EL* 65 67 (62) 67 (62) 69.9 (64.9) 71.9 (66.9) 60 67 (62) 67 (62) 69.9 (64.9) 71.9 (66.9)
ES 65 65 (63) 65.8 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 65 65 (63) 65.8 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63)
FR 65 65.8 (60.8) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62) 65 65.8 (60.8) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62)
HR - 65 (60) 65 (60) 67 (62) 67 (62) - 60.8 (55.8) 62.5 (57.5) 67 (62) 67 (62)
IT* 65 66.3 66.8 68.4 (65.4) 70 (67) 60 62.3 66.8 68.4 (65.4) 70 (67)
CY* 65 65 (63) 65 (63) 67 (65) 69 (67) 65 65 (63) 65 (63) 67 (65) 69 (67)
LV 62 62 (60) 63.8 (61.8) 65 (63) 65 (63) 62 62 (60) 63.8 (61.8) 65 (63) 65 (63)
LT 62.5 62.8 (57.8) 64 (59) 65 (60) 65 (60) 60 60.7 (55.7) 63 (58) 65 (60) 65 (60)
LU 65 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57)
HU 62 62 (62) 64.5 (64.5) 65 (65) 65 (65) 62 62 (62) 64.5 (64.5) 65 (65) 65 (65)
MT 61 62 (61) 63 (61) 65 (61) 65 (61) 60 62 (61) 63 (61) 65 (61) 65 (61)
NL* 65 65.1 (65.1) 66.3 (66.3) 69.3 (69.3) 71.5 (71.5) 65 65.1 (65.1) 66.3 (66.3) 69.3 (69.3) 71.5 (71.5)
AT 65 65 (62) 65 (62) 65 (62) 65 (62) 60 60 (58.8) 60 (60) 65 (62) 65 (62)
PL 65 65.3 (65.3) 67 (67) 67 (67) 67 (67) 60 60.3 (60.3) 62 (62) 67 (67) 67 (67)
PT* 65 65 (55) 66.4 (55) 67.7 (55) 68.8 (55) 65 65 (55) 66.4 (55) 67.7 (55) 68.8 (55)
RO 63 64.7 (59.7) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 58 59.7 (54.7) 61.4 (56.4) 63 (58) 63 (58)
SI 63 65 (58.3) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 61 63.5 (58) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60)
SK* 62 62 (60) 62.8 (60.8) 65.4 (63.4) 67.8 (65.8) 55-59 58.3 (56.3) 62.8 (60.8) 65.4 (63.4) 67.8 (65.8)
FI 62-68 68 (62) 68 (63) 68 (63) 68 (63) 62-68 68 (62) 68 (63) 68 (63) 68 (63)
SE 61-67 67 (61) 67 (61) 67 (61) 67 (61) 61-67 67 (61) 67 (61) 67 (61) 67 (61)
UK 65 65 (65) 66 (66) 66.7 (66.7) 68 (68) 60 61 (61) 66 (66) 66.7 (66.7) 68 (68)
EU 64 65 (61) 65 (62) 67 (63) 67 (64) 62 63 (60) 64 (61) 66 (63) 67 (64)
EA 64 65 (61) 66 (62) 67 (63) 67 (63) 63 64 (60) 66 (61) 67 (63) 67 (63)
MEN WOMEN
2012 AR 2015 AR 2012 AR 2015 AR
Average absolute increase (2060 - base year) 1.8 2.6 3.2 4.0
Number of countries projecting an increase 15 23 17 25
Male Female
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Graph 5. Statutory retirement age, male                            Graph 6. Statutory retirement age, female           
    
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
Notes: From 2040 onwards, the lowest statutory retirement age for males is 65 for most Member States, therefore 
countries are not reported below the average in Graph 5. 
Because of the pension reforms that increase the statutory retirement age in a majority of Member 
States, longer working lives are projected, leading to an increase in the effective exit age from the 
labour market by about 2 years by 2060 in the EU (up by 1.8 years for men and by 2.3 years for 
women) (see Graph 7). Hence, the increase in the effective exit age is not projected to increase at the 
same pace as the statutory retirement age due to higher incidence of disability at higher ages and the 
prevalence of other pathways out of the labour force.  
Graph 7. Effective exit age from the labour market, males and females                                                           
    
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
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On average in the EU, despite the increase in both statutory retirement age and effective exit age from 
the labour market, the duration of retirement is expected to increase by about 3 years for men and by 1 
½ for women over the long term (see Graphs 8 and 9). The lower increase in the duration of retirement 
up to 2060 for females is due to the fact that some countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Austria, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom) are equalising the statutory 
retirement age for men and women gradually through a more marked increase for females.  
Graph 8. Duration of retirement, male                            Graph 9. Duration of retirement, female                    
    
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
Reducing relative pension benefits 
In addition to measures adopted to curtail eligibility trough increasing retirement age and closing 
alternative pathways to early retirement, another set of measures (on the number of years and 
valorisation of pensionable earnings, indexation of pensions in payment, calculation of accruals) aimed 
at reducing relative public pension generosity (in terms of benefits) has also been legislated by many 
EU countries (see Table 4). These parametric changes concern both the calculation of the first pension 
in payment, as well as the way it is valued over time (indexation of pensions in payment). First, several 
countries have extended the period over which earnings are taken into account for the calculation of 
the first pension, instead of restricting pensionable earnings to a limited number of final and / or best 
salaries. This measure has the effect of reducing pension benefits, given the normal upward slope to 
the age-earnings profile for most workers7. Indeed, pensionable earnings reference have moved to a 
(quasi-) lifetime average earnings measures in as many as 18 Member States. Only Spain, France, 
Lithuania, Malta, Austria and Slovenia still define, under current legislation, pensionable earnings over 
a restricted career period (see Table A3 in Annex for a comparison between the pensionable earnings 
reference in the 2015 AR compared to the 2006 AR). As an additional measure to curtail benefits, 
many countries have moved to a less generous valorisation rule, used to adjust past earnings to 
changes in living standards, between the time pension rights are accrued and when they are claimed 
(see Table A4 in Annex for a comparison between the valorisation rule used in the 2015 AR compared 
to the 2006 AR). Only a few countries adopted a strict pure price-valorisation rule (like in France, 
Belgium and Portugal). Several Members states adopted instead a mix of partial nominal wage - 
nominal price valorisation (e. g. Greece, Croatia, Romania, and Finland), while half of the EU 
countries kept the more generous wage-valorisation rule. Other countries chose to reduce annual 
accrual rates either directly (e. g. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovakia), or indirectly via, for 
example, an increase of the contributory period to receive a full pension (e. g. Belgium, France), the 
use of penalties for early retirement (see previous sub-section), or the introduction of a "sustainability 
factor" linked to changes in life expectancy (see Table 7).  
 
                                                            
7 Of course, such measures do not concern countries, where public pension schemes mainly provide a flat-rate pension (e. g. 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK).  
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Graph 10. Average accrual rates for new pensions over the period 2010-2060 (%):2012 AR versus 2015 AR         
 
Source: Ageing Report (2012, 2015) 
Notes: See Graph A1 in the Annex for complementary data on accrual rates' projections. 
 
Finally, another parametric reform used to reduce pension benefits progression has been the shift in 
several Member States towards less generous adjustment rules for pensions in payment. Indeed, many 
EU countries have moved from adjusting pension benefits to wages to a full or partial indexation to 
prices (see Graph 11 and table A.5 in the Annex). Full indexation to prices is again relatively rare 
however (it is the case in France, Italy, Hungary and Austria; see Table 4). A majority of Member 
States adopted instead a partial indexation rule to prices (for example, indexation mix of wages and 
prices – Swiss formula, or of wages and GDP). In addition, some countries introduced a "sustainability 
factor" or other "reduction coefficients" into the indexation calculation (see below). This is the case in 
particular in Spain with the introduction of an index for adjusting pensions in payment, projected to 
progress less quickly than inflation (for details see the Ageing Report 2015)8. 
Graph 11. Evolution of pension indexation rules in EU Member States since the 2001 AR (% of total EU 
countries whose indexation rule is based on…) 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2001, 2015) 
Notes: Indexation rules are spread between pure (or less) price-indexation rules ("prices-"), pure wage-valorisation 
rules ("wages+") and indexation rules based on a combination of variables (prices, wages, GDP, etc.). Moreover, in 
a few countries, there is no explicit indexation rule. 
                                                            
8 The UK, on the other hand, moved in the opposite direction, returning to earnings indexation after having adopted price 
linking in the early 1980's. This is linked to the low level of public pension replacement rate and benefit ratio in this country. 
More generally, countries with less generous public pension systems have somehow adopted less restrictive measures (see 
below).  
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On top of pension measures affecting the expenditure side, many Member States relied on revenue-
enhancing measures in order to balance public pension schemes. Several countries increased social 
contribution rates (e.g. Denmark, France), especially after the crisis (e. g. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, 
Portugal, Finland, UK). Some EU Member States ear-marked tax revenue for the public pension 
system (e.g. 1 point of VAT in Germany). Other countries raised civil servants' contributions (e. g. 
Ireland, France, Cyprus, Portugal, UK) and / or reduced tax reliefs / allowances on pension benefits 
(e.g. Ireland, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Romania). Moreover, Germany introduced a balancing 
mechanism whereby contributions are quasi-automatically adjusted to ensure the financial equilibrium 
of the public pension system. Finally, a growing number of countries (15), while maintaining the 
unfunded nature of their public pension system, have introduced reserve funds to be used to finance 
the projected increase of spending (e.g. Ireland, France, see Tables 5 and 6 below).  
Table 4. Key parameters defining public pension benefits in the EU (old-age pensions)                                 
   
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
Notes: A more detailed and comprehensive description of the EU Member States pension systems is in The 2015 
Ageing Report – Underlying assumptions and projections methodologies, European Economy 8 – 2014. 
BG Pensionable earnings reference is full career starting from 1997. 3 Best years before 1997 
CZ Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1986. Currently 30 years to be considered. 
EL Pensionable earnings reference is full career starting from 2011. Best 10 years before 2011.  
ES Pensionable earnings reference is last 25 years as of 2022. The maximum value of the valorisation rule is close to 
prices. The IPR is established annually at a level consistent with a balanced budget of the Social Security system 
over the medium run. 
FR The pensionable earnings reference is full career in AGIRC and ARRCO. Valorisation rule and indexation rules are 
price - 1% in both AGIRC and ARRCO in 2014 and 2015. AGIRC: Association générale des institutions de retraite des 
cadres; ARRCO: Association pour le régime de retraite complémentaire des salariés; CNAVTS: Caisse nationale de 
l'assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salariés. 
LT Pensionable earnings reference is 25 best years after 1994 and 5 best years for the period 1984-1993.  
LU Indexation rule is wages if sufficient financial resources available, otherwise only cost of living indexation. 
HU Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1988. 
MT Pensionable earnings reference rule applies to people born as of 1962 
AT Pensionable earnings reference is converging towards the best 40 years in 2028. Currently 25 best years 
PT Pensionable earnings reference is full career as of 2002. 10 best years out of last 15 before 2002. Price and wage 
valorisation rule applies to earnings registered between 2002 and 2011.  
RO Price valorisation and indexation after 2030. 
SK Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1984. 
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2.1.2. Several European countries enacted systemic pension reforms 
'Old' Member States 
Next to parametric pension reforms, five 'old' Member States have adopted additionally systemic 
reforms (as pointed out by Hering (2006); see Box 1). This is the case of Sweden, Italy, Greece, and 
to some extent Germany and Austria. Sweden and Italy shifted at the end of the 1990's to an NDC 
(Notional Defined Contributions)9 public pension system, while gradually moving from a dominant 
pillar model to a multi-pillar one. Greece in 2010 introduced a basic pension and reformed the Defined 
benefit (DB) first pillar. In 2012, it transformed its second pillar in an NDC system, and more recently 
(in May 2016), legislated a new systemic pension reform (the new system, while curtailing pension 
benefits further, reflects most of the structural features of the 2010 and 2012 reforms). 
Germany also reformed its public pension point system (1992 and 2004 reforms),10 which now 
presents features close to an NDC system, and encouraged private pensions. More recently, Austria 
introduced a new harmonised public pension scheme, more actuarially-oriented than previous schemes 
and based on individual pension accounts. A common feature of the ground-breaking reforms engaged 
by these countries is that, besides aiming at enhancing sustainability, they have tended to substitute 
relatively fragmented schemes with a more unified public scheme. 
Table 5. Main characteristics of pension systems in "old" EU Member States…                                                 
    
Source: Ageing Report (2006, 2009, 2012, 2015) 
* Legal framework for occupational schemes; however, not implemented so far. 
Notes: i) in red, countries where private schemes currently provide substantial income to retired people (at least 10% 
of GDP), in blue, countries where they are expected to provide high share in the future (maturing schemes). ii) Pre-
funding of public pension schemes refers to the existence of reserve funds in some countries set up to secure public 
pension schemes. 
                                                            
9 These schemes are designed to mimic most of the features of DC schemes. The pension depends on contributions, which are 
tracked in accounts earning a notional rate of return, but unlike DC plans, the rate of return is set by the government and often 
linked to wage or GDP growth. These schemes remain PAYG financed: no assets are accumulated.  
10 In a point system, workers earn pension points based on their individual earnings for each year of contributions. At 
retirement, the sum of pension points is multiplied by a pension-point value to convert them into a regular pension payment.  
PAYG pre-funded Flat-rate DB PS NDC Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary
BE x x x x x x
DK x x x x x
DE x x x x x
IE x x x x x x x
EL x x x x x
ES x x x x x
FR x x x x x x
IT x x x x
LU x x x x x
NL x x x x x
AT x x x x
PT x x x x x x
FI x x x x x
SE x x x x x x
UK x x x x x
Sub-total 
"old" MSs 15 9 5 12 2 3 7 10 1 15
% total 100% 60% 33% 80% 13% 20% 47% 67% 7% 100%
Private occupational 
schemes
Private individual 
schemesPublic pension schemes
Financing Type of pensions Status Status
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Box 1. SYSTEMIC PENSION REFORMS IN SELECTED "OLD" MEMBER STATES: THE CASE OF SWEDEN, ITALY, 
GREECE, GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 
Since the 1990's (more recently in Austria), Sweden, Italy, Germany and Austria initiated systemic reforms 
of their pension systems, in line (especially in Germany and Italy) with projected strong increases of their 
old-age dependency ratio (see Graph 12 for the levels projected in the Ageing Report 2009). Moreover, tax 
burdens were already relatively high at that time (especially in Sweden but also in Austria), making further 
increases in contribution rates untenable. 
Graph 12. Old-age dependency ratio (% of population of 15-64)                                                                
 
Source: Ageing Report (2009) 
• Sweden: in 1998, after a long process of consultation and research, Sweden enacted, with a large 
consensus, a radical pension reform, which was fully implemented in 2003 (Natalia and Stamati, 
2013). This reform introduced new NDC rules for public pensions, as well as new (relatively small) 
supplementary DC pillars (the old system consisted mainly of a flat-rate pension and an earnings-
related PAYG DB component). Private pensions, which represented around 20% of total pension 
expenditure in 2005 (according to Eurostat), should represent over a third of pension spending by 
2060 (according to the Ageing Report 2015).  
• Italy: with the 1992-93 and 1995 reforms, Italy adopted a NDC public pension system and moved 
towards a three-pillar structure. However, the phasing-in of the NDC system is very slow (as a 
comparison, while in Sweden the old DB system will be completely phased-out by 2020, in Italy it 
will be the case only by the mid-2030's, implying a full implementation of the reform over 35 
years), and the coverage of supplementary pensions remains limited (thus additional measures were 
adopted before the crisis including higher fiscal incentives and "automatic" transfer to pension funds 
of severance pay for the private sector employees).  
• Germany: since 1992, Germany, faced with the reunification costs as well as dramatic projected 
demographic changes, has substantially reformed its pension system. Through the 1992 and the 
2004 reforms (introduction of contribution and sustainability factors), the German public pension 
point system has come close to an NDC system. Moreover, the 2001 Riester reform enacted the start 
of a progressive shift towards a multi-pillar system. In 2012, private pensions represented around 
10% of total pension expenditure (according to Eurostat).  
• Austria: in 2005, Austria introduced a new harmonised public pension system, more actuarially-
oriented than prevailing schemes. Although based on individual pension accounts, the new system 
remains a PAYG DB system (closer to the German point system than to the Swedish NDC system, 
according to Knell et al, 2006). In parallel, two new private pension schemes have been introduced 
(the "new severance pay scheme" and the "premium-aided pension savings scheme") to encourage 
the expansion of second and third pillars. Even if the coverage of these schemes has increased 
during the last decade, private pensions remain limited in Austria. 
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'New' Member States 
In response to population ageing pressures, and typically in the context of their transition to market 
economies, many 'new' European countries also enacted systemic pension reforms in the late 
1990's – early 2000's. These reforms were largely influenced by the multi-pillar approach promoted 
by the World Bank (1994), with a large role given to private individual pensions (Grech, 2010). 
Indeed, most of the "new" EU Member States introduced mandatory private individual schemes (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary11, Poland12, Romania and Slovakia13), while a 
smaller group of countries adopted mandatory private occupational schemes (e.g. Cyprus and 
Slovenia14). At the same time, some countries converted their old DB public pillar to a point system (e. 
g. Croatia, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) or an NDC system (e. g. Latvia and Poland). An important 
element is that the pre-funding of the new private pension schemes was often financed through the 
reallocation of part of the social contributions – taxes raised for the statutory PAYG public scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 These schemes were partially brought into the general government sector in 2011; the remaining schemes are now 
voluntary (see below).  
12 In 2013, the part of assets of these schemes (OFE) held in government bonds has been shifted to the public NDC account. 
In 2014, the membership to these schemes became voluntary.  
13 During their existence, the participation to these private individual schemes has changed several times from mandatory to 
voluntary for new comers.  
14 In Cyprus and Slovenia, mandatory occupational schemes concern mainly public sector employees. In Lithuania, a legal 
framework for occupational private pensions has been adopted in 2006, but there are no occupational pensions so far. The 
same situation (as in Lithuania) prevails in Malta.  
• Greece: In the recent years the Parliament adopted two comprehensive reforms of the main 
pension scheme (2010) and of the supplementary public pension scheme (2012). The first reforms 
aimed at simplify the highly fragmented pension system, enhance transparency and fairness, 
postpone the retirement age and decrease the generosity of benefits. The new rules on entitlements, 
contributions, valorisation and indexation of pension rights apply to all main schemes and pro rata 
to all current and future workers. The supplementary pension scheme has been transformed into a 
NDC scheme. In 2016 a new systemic pension reform has been legislated. It further curtails 
pension benefits by creating a closer link between contribution and benefit (by, among other 
things, abolishing the pro rata application of the previous reforms), while maintaining most of the 
structural features of the 2010 and 2012 reforms. 
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Table 6. Main characteristics of pension systems in "new" EU Member States                                                   
   
 
Source: Ageing Report (2006, 2009, 2012, 2015) 
* Legal framework for occupational schemes; however, not implemented so far. 
Notes: i) in red, countries where private schemes currently provide substantial income to retired people (at least 10% 
of GDP), in blue, countries where they are expected to provide high share in the future (maturing schemes). ii) Pre-
funding of public pension schemes refers to the existence of reserve funds in some countries set up to secure public 
pension schemes 
Addressing longevity risk through automatic mechanisms 
One of the most important features of pension reforms over the last two decades, whether countries 
engaged or not in a systemic change, has been the introduction of mechanisms aimed at 
automatically adjusting the key pension parameters (pension age, benefits, financing resources) to 
changes in life expectancy. Indeed, since the mid-1990's, half of the EU Member States have adopted 
either automatic balancing mechanisms, sustainability factors (i.e. a direct link between pension 
benefits and life expectancy) and / or automatic links between retirement age and life expectancy (see 
Tables 7 and 8).  
At the time of the completion of the first Ageing Report (2001 AR), only four Member States (14% of 
EU countries) had introduced such mechanisms. Automatic balancing mechanisms ensure that the 
pension system will be able to remain financially sustainable by adjusting benefits' indexation and / or 
by social contributions when needed. Such balancing mechanisms exist only in three countries: in 
Sweden since 1998 (reduced indexation in case the pension system would show a deficit in the 
medium-term15 ), in Germany since 2004 (the contribution rate is automatically adjusted so that the 
statutory pension scheme is in balance, and pension indexation is reduced through a contribution rate 
factor and the sustainability factor) and in Spain since 2013 (reduced indexation when the pension 
system is in financial disequilibrium). The introduction of sustainability factors (i.e. of a factor that 
changes the size of the pension benefit depending on expected demographic changes, such as life 
expectancy at the time of retirement) has been more widespread (8 countries – although not fully 
automatic in France and in Denmark). Finally, several countries (8) have introduced an automatic link 
between retirement ages and life expectancy, as early as in 1995 in Italy, and more recently in 
                                                            
15 This may be due to e.g. low returns on the pension fund assets or low wage (GDP) growth. 
PAYG pre-funded Flat-rate DB PS NDC Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary
BG x x x x x
CZ x x x x
EE x x x x x x
HR x x x x x
CY x x x x x
LV x x x x x
LT x x x* x x
HU x x x x
MT x x x x* x
PL x x x x x
RO x x x x
SI x x x x x x
SK x x x x
Sub-total 
"new" MSs 13 6 1 7 4 2 5 6 7 12
% total 100% 46% 8% 54% 31% 15% 38% 46% 54% 92%
Public pension schemes Private occupational schemes
Private individual 
schemes
Financing Type of pensions Status Status
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Greece, Slovakia and Finland. These countries are, not surprisingly, the ones projecting the highest 
increases in retirement age over the long run (especially for men; for women, harmonisation trends 
imply sometimes steep increases even in countries without such an automatic link). Few countries 
have introduced simultaneously two automatic adjustment mechanisms (e. g. Italy, Sweden, Portugal, 
Spain and Finland).  
All in all, by 2015 half of the EU Member States (14 MSs) had introduced automatic mechanisms that 
enhance the sustainability of pension systems, and some of them had introduced more than one 
mechanism (see Table 8).  
Table 7. Automatic mechanisms in public pension system in the EU                                                                  
   
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015), updated for Finland 
Notes: in red, after 2009. 
 
Table 8. Total number of automatic mechanisms in public pension system in the EU                                      
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015), updated for Finland 
2.1.3. Accompanying measures to ensure lasting success of implemented reforms, 
preserve adequacy and further harmonise pension rules  
A key objective of (public) pension reforms enacted over the last decade(s) has been to enhance fiscal 
sustainability. In addition, different accompanying measures have been taken in order to preserve 
pension adequacy and / or increase the fairness of the pension system (and thus support the social 
acceptability of pension reforms), as follows:  
• Attempts to harmonise different pension schemes (especially between the private and the 
generally more favourable public sector) have been made. Several Member States have carried 
reforms aimed at further aligning rules applying to the public sector (civil servants) and / or 
special pension schemes with the ones prevailing in the general regime (e. g. Austria, Italy, 
Country Automatic balancing mechanism
Sustainability factor 
(benefit link to life 
expectancy)
Retirement age linked 
to life expectancy Legislated 
Italy X X 1995 & 2010
Latvia X 1996
Poland X 1999
Sweden X X 2001 & 1998
France* X 2003
Germany X 2004
Finland X X 2005 & 2015
Portugal X X 2007 & 2013
Greece X 2010
Denmark** X 2011
Netherlands X 2012
Cyprus X 2012
Slovak Republic X 2012
Spain X X 2013 & 2011
Total number of 
automatic 
mechanisms
% EU28 with automatic 
mechanisms
2001 AR 4 14%
2006 AR 8 25%
2012 AR 13 39%
2015 AR 19 50%
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France, Ireland, Greece, Romania). In some cases, civil servants and special pension schemes 
have been closed to new entrants (e. g. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal). In Greece, several reforms 
have tried to tackle the problem of the pension system fragmentation (2002 and 2008 reforms, 
which allowed merging different pension schemes; 2010 reform and, more recently, the 2016 
reform, which set more unified rules across the different schemes);  
• To compensate for the increase of early / statutory retirement ages, some flexibilities have 
often been introduced (or maintained) to take into account long careers (e.g. France, 
Germany) and in some cases, hazardous jobs (e.g. Greece);  
• While pension ages were generally lower for women than for men in the past (average 
difference of 2 years in 2008 in the EU, with 5 years gaps in France, Italy, Austria, Poland, 
Romania and the UK for example), most countries have legislated a gradual equalisation of 
pension ages between gender (by 2060, those ages should be equal in all EU countries but 
Bulgaria and Romania);  
• In countries characterised by low benefit and replacement ratios, especially some Eastern 
European countries and / or countries with flat-rate public pensions (see Graph 13), some 
measures have been adopted to increase public pension system adequacy (e.g. Bulgaria, 
which increased its accrual rate in 2014; UK, which adopted a more favourable indexation 
rule in 2007).  
Graph 13. Gross average replacement ratio in 2013 (%, public pensions)                                                        
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
* Earnings-related public pensions (information not available on public pensions). EL figure includes the public 
mandatory supplementary pension. When only the main scheme is considered the RR is 64% (still the third highest 
value in the EU). 
Notes: The gross average replacement ratio is defined as the average first public pension paid in 2013as a share of 
the average wage at retirement. Information not available for the UK.
 
2.2. (PUBLIC) PENSION REFORMS IN THE WAKE OF THE 2008-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The financial and economic crisis of 2009 has had a profound impact on retirement-income systems of 
all different designs: private funded pension schemes first saw a strong reduction in the value of their 
assets (-23% during 2008); then, their financial equilibrium was challenged by very low rates of return, 
while the deterioration of public finances led to reducing public support (through reduced tax-
incentives or direct subsidies, and – often temporary – reduction of contributions). But public pension 
PAYG schemes were also affected. Falling employment along with lower growth or even declines in 
wages hit the revenue side. Moreover, in some countries, the expenditure side was also affected, as 
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older-workers losing their jobs were more willing to choose to retire early (Whitehouse, 2012). On top 
of this, the rapid rise of public debt in some European countries (due to banking bailouts and the 
economic crisis) called for acute fiscal consolidation.  
In this context, the pace of pension system reforms has accelerated since 2008-09 in the EU 
Member States, often adopting a mix of temporary / short-term effects measures (see Table 9) and 
additional structural measures: 
• In many cases, temporary measures were adopted to reduce the financial burden of public 
pension expenditures (e.g. freeze of indexation and even cuts in pensions in payment) and / or 
increase resources (e.g. increase in contribution rates, taxes or tax bases). Moreover, because 
of the huge impact of the crisis on public budgets, in several countries, some pension 
measures adopted took effect almost immediately, or very shortly after the legislation had 
been adopted (e.g. increase of the retirement age for women in Italy; see also Box 2). This 
contrasts with past pension reforms that were generally allowing for considerable transition 
periods;  
• Moreover, additional structural measures to enhance the sustainability of public schemes were 
also taken, as seen above (e.g. the adoption of automatic adjustment mechanisms in 8 
countries over 4 years after the crisis, while the same number of countries adopted such 
mechanisms over a prolonged period of 14 years before the crisis; see Table 7 above).  
 
Table 9. Selected short-term / rapid & systemic pension measures adopted since the financial crisis          
  
* Reduction contested through Constitutional Court decisions and / or later on reverted. 
** Temporary. 
*** Participation in DC private schemes changed from mandatory to voluntary.
Source: Ageing Report (2015), SPC report (2015) 
Notes: i) In the Czech Republic, the voluntary fully funded pillar introduced in 2013 should be abolished (possibly by 
the end of 2015). Ii) Countries, which benefited from financial assistance during the crisis, are in red. 
 
 
Direct cuts in 
pensions in 
payment
Frozen / reduced 
indexation
Increased taxes 
(rate, base) / 
contributions 
Rapid rise in 
retirement age
Immediate closure 
of early retirement 
acess
Reduction in tax 
incentives / 
subsidies to 
private pensions 
Reduction of 
contributions to 
mandatory private 
schemes 
Roll-back of 
private pension 
schemes
BE x
BG x x x*
CZ x x*
DK x x
EE x x**
IE x (civil servants) x x
EL x x x x x x
ES x
FR x
HR x x
IT x x* x x
CY x x x
LV x* x x x
LT x* x
HU x x x x x x
NL x
AT x x x
PL x x x
PT x* x x*
RO x* x x x**
SI x* x
SK x** x** x***
FI x x x
SE x
UK x
Measures affecting pension system architectureShort effects measures on eligibilityTemporary measures on pension benefits
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Box 2. STATUTORY RETIREMENT AGES: AN ACCELERATION OF THE INCREASE SINCE THE CRISIS? 
Over the period 2008-2013, important increases of statutory pension ages have been observed in some 
countries, in particular in Greece, Slovenia and Italy (see Graph 14). In some cases, these increases have 
been particularly fast (for example, Bulgaria brought forward in 2011 the planned increase of statutory 
retirement age; Italy legislated a rapid rise of women pension age in the public sector – from 61 to 65 
between 2010 and 2012). Significant increases have also been legislated for the period 2013-2020, 
especially in the UK, Italy and Slovakia (mainly for women; see Graph 15).  
Graphs 14 and 15. Legislated increases in statutory retirement age between 2008 and 2020   
  
Statutory retirement age change                                      Statutory retirement age change  
between 2008 and 2013                                                     between 2013 and 2020 
                                                                           
      
Source: Ageing Report (2009, 2015) 
This trend seems to have translated into a sharper rise of the effective exit age from the labour market in 
2014, contrasting with more progressive increases observed since the beginning of the 2000's. This 
evolution is particularly outstanding in the post-crisis context of high unemployment rate.  
Graphs 16. Average effective  exit age from the labour market    
                                                                          
 
Source: Ageing Report (2012, 2015) 
Notes: from 1990 to 2011, data come from OECD; after 2011, the series have been extrapolated using the 2015 
Ageing Report relative changes. 
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Reversal of previous reforms: the case of private funded pension schemes 
In other cases, mainly in Eastern European countries, the difficulties of private funded pension 
schemes, and budgetary strategies to reduce public deficit and debt16 resulted in important reversals 
of past trends (as pointed by Bielawska et al (2015) - however, these reversals are linked to many 
factors, of which fiscal rules only contributed to a limited extent17). Indeed, in Hungary and Poland, a 
roll back of private pre-funded pension arrangements was observed18. In Slovakia, the participation to 
private pension schemes was changed from mandatory to voluntary in 2013. Therefore, if in the 2009 
                                                            
16 Indeed, the pre-funding of private pension schemes is to some extent financed in CEECs through public debt issuance (as 
seen, contributions into these new schemes are most of the times financed by reallocating part of the social contributions 
raised to finance public pensions in payment; with no additional fiscal revenue raised, this has been compensated by issuing 
public debt). Thus, this pre-funding of future pension liabilities adds to the current deficit and debt, while in contrast in 
countries with no pre-funded pension liabilities, such anticipation of costs do not exist (moreover, future PAYG liabilities are 
treated as implicit liabilities and not official debt). While both types of liabilities have an impact on fiscal positions over the 
long-term, it is important to recognize that there is a difference between explicit liabilities (servicing government debt and 
honouring principal repayment), and implicit liabilities (future expenditure commitments). This issue was recognized in the 
context of the SGP in the early 2000's and led to allowing some flexibility (to take into account systemic pension reform costs 
in the application of the SGP). However, in the wake of the crisis, growing pressure to comply with SGP rules contributed to 
a reduced public support or even reversal of earlier systemic pension reforms in a number of CEECs. This issue, among 
others, was addressed with the 2011 reform of the SGP (the 'Six-pack'): indeed, account is taken of systemic pension reform 
costs both in the preventive and the corrective arms of the Pact.  
17 Outside of the crisis and short-term budgetary constraints, other reasons invoked for downsizing private pension schemes in 
CEECs include high management fees, low real returns, ineffective/insufficient risk-diversification strategies and the problem 
of regulating annuities needed for pension pay-outs (see also Egert, 2012).  
18 Note that in Bulgaria, government's attempt to shift mandatory funds' assets to the PAYG public schemes has been blocked 
by the Constitutional Court.  
Despite the progress made with increasing effective exit age and thus older workers' participation and 
employment rates in EU countries over the last decade, a number of countries (Greece, Slovenia, 
Luxembourg, Croatia, Malta, Romania) remained 10 pp. or more behind the EU average in 2015 (see Graph 
17). Moreover, men still have higher participation rates than women (see Graphs A.3 and A.4 in the 
Annex). Furthermore, there is ample scope for improvement for most EU counties in terms of catching up 
with the front runners in the EU by putting the right policies in place. Increasing the employment rate of 
older people would significantly decrease the public pension expenditure ratio in a number of countries. 
Graphs 17. Participation and employment rate in the EU  
  
Participation rate in the EU,                                                Employment rate, age group 55-64, 
by age group (%)                                                                by country (% and pp. change)                         
        
Source: Eurostat 
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AR private pension expenditures were projected to strongly increase in the long run, in more recent 
vintages this trend has substantially been revised downwards (see Table 10). Several countries (e.g. 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia) also significantly reduced contributions to private 
pension schemes (either on a temporary or a permanent basis, see Graph 18). By contrast, the 
contribution rate to the mandatory individual DC pillar has remained unchanged in Sweden since it 
was introduced in 1998 (the contribution rate is rather small at 2.5 pp. out of a total of 18.5%). More 
generally, the crisis seems to have put (at least temporarily) a halt to the expansion of the role of pre-
funded schemes in pension provision in the EU (SPC, 2015)19. Several countries also used resources 
accumulated in reserve funds, aimed at supporting public PAYG pensions systems, to finance their 
public deficit (e. g. France, Poland). In the case of Ireland, the National Pensions Reserve Fund 
(NRPF) was (partially) used for bank recapitalisation and as a guarantee for the EU / IMF loan.  
Table 10. Private pension expenditures projections in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia across different 
Ageing Report vintages (% of total public pension expenditures)                                                                      
 
Source: Ageing Report (2009, 2012, 2015) 
Notes: In the Ageing Report 2015, none of these three countries projected private pension expenditures (while the 
current level is estimated close to 0% of GDP according to Eurostat). Thus, those schemes are not expected 
anymore to represent a significant share of total pension expenditures in the long-run.
 
Graph 18. Contributions to private pension schemes in selected countries (% of GDP)                                  
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015), OECD. 
Countries that required macro-financial assistance are generally the ones that adopted the most 
comprehensive packages of (short-term / rapid) measures following the financial crisis (e.g. Greece, 
Hungary, Romania, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and Portugal; see Graph A2 in the Annex). Spain also 
adopted a substantial structural pension reform in 2013.  
Finally, in some cases, and after the peak of the financial crisis, short-term pension-related measures 
were adopted, not to foster sustainability, but with the aim of coping with the negative socio-impact 
of the crisis (e.g. Italy, which allowed employees from 2015 to 2018 to receive severance pay in their 
payroll rather than transferring it to private pension schemes, to support consumption; Bulgaria, which 
                                                            
19 Even in countries where private schemes are widespread and benefit from a large coverage, different measures had to be 
taken to restore solvency (indexation suspension, direct benefits cuts, increase of contributions, etc.), contributing to slow 
down the coverage of these schemes.  
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temporarily froze the planned increase in the retirement age in 2014 and Romania, which decreased 
social contributions paid by employers in 2014, in both cases with the objective to support short-term 
employment). More generally, several temporary measures with immediate effect that were taken in 
the wake of the financial and sovereign debt crisis were later on revisited (by Constitutional Courts and 
/ or through general elections) and gave rise in some cases to (partial) reversals (e. g. Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Greece, see Table A6 in the Annex). In several countries (e.g. 
Germany, Italy and Poland), recent debates and measures adopted, which could partially revert past 
enacted reforms, illustrate the necessity to appropriately calibrate pension reforms to ensure both fiscal 
sustainability and social acceptability. 
2.3. EU PENSION REFORMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
After over two decades of reforms, and even though pension systems still vary significantly across 
Member States, a strong public sector involvement remains a common feature for all EU Member 
States. Indeed, according to the Ageing Report 2015, public pension expenditure in 2013 was above 
11% of GDP in the EU (and above 12% in the EA), compared to an OECD average of less than 8% of 
GDP in 2011. Despite a relatively large range (going from 6.9% of GDP in the Netherlands to 16.2% 
of GDP in Greece20), public pension expenditure ratio was close or higher than the OECD average in 
24 EU countries. Public pension benefits also still represent a substantial share of European 
governments' expenditures: this share reached a third of total government expenditure in Italy in 2011, 
and was above the OECD average (at 17.5%) in more than 20 EU countries (see Graph 19).  
Graph 19. Public pension expenditure EU versus OECD average 
Public pension expenditure in 2013*                                 Public pension expenditure in 2011 
(% of GDP)                                                                            (% of total government expenditure) 
   
* Last available year for OECD average. 
Source: Ageing Report (2015), Eurostat, OECD (SOCX) 
 
Moreover, despite diverse arrangements and attempts to develop second and third pillars21 in most 
Member States, the bulk of pension benefits currently remains contribution-based and earnings-related 
(Bismarckian type system), with a relatively limited role played by private pensions. Exceptions exist 
though (for example, Denmark and the Netherlands rely to a relatively much larger extent on private 
pension funds).  
The importance of the private pillars depends on how long they have been in place, and on the 
contributions paid to them. For instance, private pillars have already been built up for a long time in 
the Netherlands, and total pensions can therefore expand despite the public pillar being more or less 
                                                            
20 Note that this high level in Greece is partially the result of the severity of the crisis in the country: if the nominal GDP level 
had remained constant at its 2007 level, public pension expenditure in 2013 would represent around 13% of GDP, though this 
would still be above EU and EA average.  
21 As we have seen in section 2.2, these attempts have been partially / temporarily halted in some countries since the financial 
crisis.  
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unchanged as a share of GDP over the next few decades (Graph 20). In Latvia, the introduction of 
private pillars is more recent (in the 1990s), but because of the private pillar, total pension (as a share 
of GDP) can expand in the long term despite the public pillar being projected to fall slightly (Graph 
21).  
Graph 20. Netherlands - Pension/GDP                           Graph 21. Latvia - Pension/GDP 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015)   
However, past reforms should in the long-run result in a reshaping of pension systems in some 
European countries, with private pillars increasingly supporting retirement incomes over time 
(Table 11 summarises the main trends in pension system design since 1995). According to the Ageing 
Report 2015, public pension spending should remain stable over the long run at the EU aggregate 
level, with 6 countries experiencing substantial decreases (close or above -2 pp of GDP in Croatia, 
Denmark, Latvia, France, Italy and Greece; at least by -0.5 pp of GDP in Sweden, Estonia, Spain, 
Portugal and Poland). In some of these countries, this downward trend will coincide with a significant 
increase in pension benefits provided by private schemes (e.g. Croatia, Denmark, Latvia, Sweden and 
Estonia).  
Table 11. Characteristics and main trends in pension system design in EU countries                                       
* This group includes countries that strongly reformed their 1st pillar (like in Greece, Italy and Austria) and / or 
countries that introduced additional pillars (representing already a significant share of total pension expenditures, or 
projected to do so in the long-run. 
Source: Presentation inspired by Grech (2010)
Notes: i) Pension reforms since 1995 is included ii) Most of countries, attempting to develop a multi-pillar pension 
system, introduced temporary / permanent measures following the financial crisis likely to have weakened the 
expansion of private pension schemes (see Table 9). Despite such measures, some countries reporting private 
pension projections for the 2015 AR, still project a substantial increase of such schemes (e. g. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania). Countries in italic are those where the intended reforms are still subject to uncertainties. iii) The Annex 
contains a Table A7 providing more details on this classification.
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3. THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF PENSION REFORMS: AN 
OVERALL REDUCTION OF PROJECTED SPENDING 
TRENDS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the past reforms described in the previous chapter, the projected changes in the pension 
expenditure as a share of GDP over the following half century have decreased since 2001 for the EU as 
a whole. Over the last 15 years and the 5 rounds of EC-EPC budgetary projections in the Ageing 
Reports, many countries have reported large decreases in projected pension expenditure due to major 
policy reforms. This chapter will examine more in details the main drivers behind such declining 
trends and to what extent such projected decrease in future pension expenditure can be considered 
sound and reliable, at least over the short-run horizon.   
One important feature of the consecutive EC-EPC budgetary projections exercises has been the 
assessment of the underlying reasons of changes in the evolution of pension expenditure. By 
comparing the main outcomes of the different vintages of pension expenditure projections, we can 
assess the main reasons for the changes occurred between the 5 rounds of projections. This analysis is 
facilitated by the fact that the projection methodology has been relatively consistent over time, since 
the first round of projections and up to now: 
• The demographic deterministic projections carried out by Eurostat were generally based on a 
very long-term "convergence" approach for each key demographic determinant, i.e. fertility 
rates, mortality rates and net level of migration, while taking due account of recent trends and 
developments at the beginning of the period.22   
• The participation rates have been projected by gender and single age using the cohort 
methodology approach23, taking particularly into account the significant rise in the labour 
force participation of women over recent decades (as younger women, with a much stronger 
attachment to the labour force, gradually replace older women with relatively low 
participation rates). The framework for projecting labour force into employment, total hours 
worked and unemployment has also remained unchanged.  
• The methodology to simulate the impact of pension reforms on the participation rates of older 
workers (through its estimated effects on the retirement decision by shifting and adjusting 
distribution probabilities of labour market exit) has been also consistent across projections 
exercises. Furthermore, in case of unchanged legislation, it was systematically agreed to use 
the changes in the exit rates as estimated in the previous wave of projections, including peer 
reviewed reforms by the AWG/EPC. 
• The structural unemployment rate estimates (NAWRU) have been also systematically used as 
a proxy for unemployment rates in the baseline scenario. The minimum country-specific or 
average anchors towards which the NAWRU rates are assumed to converge have nevertheless 
been slightly reviewed in each round of projections. 
• Potential GDP growth and its components, including TFP, have been calculated using a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, which is consistent with the 
                                                            
22 In order to ensure comparability and consistency across countries, demographic projections by Eurostat has been used since 
the 2006 projection exercise was prepared. 
23 See Carone (2005) for a detailed description. The methodology was initially developed by the ILO (see D. Latulippe 1996) 
and the OECD (see J-M. Burniaux, R. Duval and F.Jaumotte 2003). 
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methodology for estimating potential growth and output gaps developed by the OGWG. The 
capital stock in efficiency terms is assumed to remain constant in the long term (i.e. following 
the 'capital rule'). In the projections, convergence in TFP growth rates over the long run is 
assumed. Consequently, in the long run, TFP becomes the single driver of labour productivity.  
 Although the methodological approach has remained relatively unchanged, key demographic drivers 
and macroeconomic assumptions have however been revised in between the projection exercises, 
according to the changing economic and demographic context. 
As shown in Table 12, which compares the main demographic and macroeconomic assumptions at EU 
level, there were sizeable differences in some key assumptions in between the different vintages of the 
Ageing Reports. Overall in the EU, the main demographic assumptions have been the most favourable 
over the long run in both the first (2001) and the latest (2015) Ageing Reports, as highlighted by the 
overall projected change in the old-age dependency ratio peaking at +29 pp. in the 2012 round of 
projections, contrasted with +22 pp. in the last (2015) round. This large difference is due to more 
favourable fertility rate assumptions, together with a slightly lower increase in life expectancy on 
average in the 2015 Ageing Report compared to the 2009 and 2012 Ageing Reports.  
Table 12. Main underlying assumptions over consecutive budgetary projection exercises, EU                      
  
*BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FI, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE and UK. 
** All Member States except BG, RO and HR. 
*** All Member States except HR. 
Source: Ageing Report (2001, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015).
Notes: Projection horizon: 2001 and 2006 AR: 2050; 2009, 2012 and 2015 AR: 2060. The upper age limit for the 
participation rates for 65+ was 71 years for the 2001, 2006 and 2009 AR and 74 years for the 2012 and 2015 AR. 
Figures in brackets indicate the value in the base year. For detailed macroeconomic and demographic 
assumptions, see Eurostat (National accounts, POP, MIGR and LFS databases) and previous Ageing Reports. 
 
Looking at the main elements determining the labour input component of GDP growth, it appears that 
the two last projection exercises have generated the largest increases in participation rates, highlighting 
the positive expected impact of major structural pension reforms, mainly undertaken after the onset of 
the economic and financial crisis. Indeed, the financial crisis that hit the European Union in 2008-09 
prompted in many countries a strong acceleration of sustainability-enhancing pension reforms, through 
the adoption of additional measures with sometimes short-term impacts. In several cases (e. g. Greece, 
Sweden, France and Finland), reforms with particularly large impacts have been legislated between 
2008 and 2013 (see Chapter 2). Moreover, while the long-term NAWRU anchors were slightly higher 
in the last two rounds of projections, the much higher initial level of unemployment rates entails a 
stronger reduction of unemployment – corresponding to higher employment growth – over the 
projection horizon compared with the past. 
Considering the macroeconomic assumptions and more specifically the expected labour productivity 
growth, the crucial assumption on productivity growth has been revised downward in consecutive 
2001 AR* 2006 AR** 2009 AR*** 2012 AR*** 2015 AR
Demographic assumptions
Fertility rate (last year) 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8
Fertility rate (overall change) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Increase in LE (Men) 5 (75) 6.3 (75.4) 8.5 (76) 7.9 (76.7) 7.1 (77.6)
Increase in LE (Women) 4.2 (81.3) 5.1 (81.5) 6.9 (82.1) 6.5 (82.5) 6 (83.1)
Net migration (start period) - as % of total pop 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0
Net migration (end period) - as % of total pop 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Old-age dependency ratio (overall change) 25.0 26.9 27.0 29.0 22.0
Labour force assumptions
Unemployment rates (last year) 5.8 6.1 5.7 6.3 6.4
Unemployment rates (overall change) -2.8 -3.1 -1.6 -3.3 -4.4
Participation rates 55-64 MEN (overall change) 3.3 (52.6) 13.2 (53.5) 9.7 (57.3) 11.2 (58.8) 10.2 (62.8)
Participation rates 55-64 WOMEN (overall change) 16.8 (29.9) 21.6 (32.6) 19.9 (38.2) 21.7 (41.1) 20.9 (46.5)
Participation rates 65+ MEN (overall change) -1.1 (5) 2.9 (11.3) 8.3 (11.8) 7.3 (10.3) 8.9 (11.6)
Participation rates 65+ WOMEN (overall change) -0.2 (1.9) 2.9 (5.3) 11.2 (6.1) 8.7 (5.7) 11.2 (6.3)
Macroeconomic assumptions
Labour productivity growth (annual average) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4
Labour input growth (annual average) -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Potential GDP growth (annual average) 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4
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projection rounds, emphasising the risk of lower TFP growth in the future, in light of the trend decline 
over the last decades. 
The heat-map in Table 13 summarises, for each projection exercise and for the main assumptions, at 
aggregated level24, which one has been more favourable (green) or less favourable (orange) when 
compared to the average of all rounds of projections.  
Table 13. Overall classification of main assumptions by comparing budgetary projection exercises             
*BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FI, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE and UK. 
** All Member States except BG, RO and HR. 
*** All Member States except HR. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
3.2. COMPARING THE PROJECTIONS 
An overall reduction of the projected increase in the public pension expenditure ratio 
The projected change in pension expenditure as a share of GDP for each projection exercise is depicted 
in Graph 22 for the EU as a whole (Pension spending as a share of GDP is provided in Graph A.5 in the 
Annex). Each consecutive projection shows a smaller increase by 2040 (i.e. when demographic ageing 
reaches its peak), with increases of 3.2 pp. of GDP in 2001, going progressively down in successive 
vintages till a low of 0.4 pp. of GDP in the 2015 projection exercise (2015 Ageing Report). After 2040, 
pension expenditure was projected to decline in the 2001, 2006 and 2015 projections, while in 2009 and 
2012 projection exercises it was projected to keep on increasing until the end of the projection period. 
The 2001 and 2006 projections had a timespan until 2050, showing overall increases in pension 
expenditure of 2.9 pp. of GDP and 2.2 pp. of GDP respectively. The more recent 2009, 2012 and 2015 
projection exercises extended coverage to 2060, with lower overall increases between each consecutive 
projection (2.3 pp. of GDP, 1.5 pp. of GDP and -0.2 p.p of GDP respectively) (see Table 14). 
Graph 22. Changes in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP in the 2001, 2009, 2012 and 2015 
vintages, European Union.                                                                   
 
Source: Ageing Report (2001, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015).
Notes: Graph A.5 contains public pension expenditure as a share of GDP in levels. 
                                                            
24 Using simple averages of the relevant assumptions shown in Table 12. 
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There are, however, large differences between countries, as can be seen in Table 3. The largest 
downward revision in pension expenditure between projection periods (over 10 pp. of GDP between 
the 2006 AR and the 2015 AR) can be seen in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal, all countries that have 
introduced significant reforms to their pension systems since 2001. Consistently, low or negative 
expenditure changes are reported in countries that had already reformed their pension system before 
2001 (e.g. EE, IT, LV, PL and SE). In many countries the projected change in pension expenditure 
does not vary significantly between projection exercises, implying that no major policy changes have 
taken place in this time period. However, in some cases the underlying assumptions alone can have a 
strong impact on the dynamics of pension expenditure. This is the case, for example, for Finland, 
where pension expenditure was expected to increase by 3.2 pp. of GDP in the 2012 projections, and 
only by 0.1 pp. of GDP in the 2015 projections with no other changes, except for underlying 
assumptions. This is also the case for Luxembourg, where pension expenditure was projected to 
increase by 9.4 pp. of GDP in the 2012 projections, and by a reduced 4.1 pp. of GDP in the 2015 
projections, driven by improved demographic projections and very limited impact from policy 
changes.  
Table 14. Overall projected change in public pension expenditure as % of GDP by budgetary projection 
exercise                                                              
 
Source: Ageing Report (2001, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015). 
Note: For BE, the effect of the 2015 pension reform has been incorporated. Original 2015 AR projection indicated an 
increase of 3.3% of GDP. 
Main factors behind the changes in pension expenditure between the 2009 and 2012 
and the 2012 and 2015 projections 
Table 15 shows the breakdown of the main reasons for the differences in the change in public pension 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP between the 2009 and 2012 projections and between the 2012 and 
2015 projections for the countries that reported these figures in their country fiches (15 Member States 
2001 AR 2006 AR 2009 AR 2012 AR 2015 AR
BE 3.3 (10) 5.1 (10.4) 4.8 (10) 5.6 (11) 1.3 (11.8)
BG : : 3 (8.3) 1.1 (9.9) -0.4 (9.9)
CZ : 5.6 (8.5) 3.3 (7.8) 2.7 (9.1) 0.7 (9)
DK 2.8 (10.5) 3.3 (9.5) 0.1 (9.1) -0.6 (10.1) -3.1 (10.3)
DE 5.1 (11.8) 1.7 (11.4) 2.3 (10.4) 2.6 (10.8) 2.7 (10)
EE : -2.5 (6.7) -0.7 (5.6) -1.1 (8.9) -1.3 (7.6)
IE 4.4 (4.6) 6.4 (4.7) 4.6 (4) 4.1 (7.5) 1.1 (7.4)
EL 12.2 (12.6) : 12.4 (11.7) 1 (13.6) -1.9 (16.2)
ES 7.9 (9.4) 7.1 (8.6) 6.7 (8.4) 3.6 (10.1) -0.8 (11.8)
FR 3.7 (12.1) 2 (12.8) 1 (13) 0.5 (14.6) -2.8 (14.9)
HR : : : : -3.9 (10.8)
IT 0.3 (13.8) 0.4 (14.2) -0.4 (14) -0.9 (15.3) -1.9 (15.7)
CY : 12.9 (6.9) 11.4 (6.3) 8.7 (7.6) -0.1 (9.5)
LV : -1.2 (6.8) -0.4 (5.4) -3.8 (9.7) -3.1 (7.7)
LT : 1.8 (6.7) 4.6 (6.8) 3.5 (8.6) 0.3 (7.2)
LU 1.9 (7.4) 7.4 (10) 15.2 (8.7) 9.4 (9.2) 4.1 (9.4)
HU : 6.7 (10.4) 3 (10.9) 2.8 (11.9) -0.1 (11.5)
MT : -0.4 (7.4) 6.2 (7.2) 5.5 (10.4) 3.2 (9.6)
NL 5.7 (7.9) 3.5 (7.7) 4 (6.6) 3.6 (6.8) 0.9 (6.9)
AT 2.5 (14.5) -1.2 (13.4) 0.9 (12.8) 2 (14.1) 0.5 (13.9)
PL : -5.9 (13.9) -3.5 (11.6) -2.2 (11.8) -0.7 (11.3)
PT 3.4 (9.8) 9.7 (11.1) 2.1 (11.4) 0.2 (12.5) -0.7 (13.8)
RO : : 7.9 (6.6) 3.7 (9.8) -0.1 (8.2)
SI : 7.3 (11) 8.8 (9.9) 7.1 (11.2) 3.5 (11.8)
SK : 1.8 (7.2) 3.4 (6.8) 5.2 (8) 2.2 (8.5)
FI 4.6 (11.3) 3.1 (10.7) 3.3 (10) 3.2 (12) 0.1 (12.9)
SE 1.7 (9) 0.6 (10.6) -0.1 (9.5) 0.6 (9.6) -1.4 (8.9)
UK -1.1 (5.5) 2 (6.6) 2.7 (6.6) 1.5 (7.7) 0.7 (7.7)
NO : : 4.7 (8.9) 4.9 (9.3) 2.5 (9.9)
EU 2.9 (10.4) 2.2 (10.6) 2.3 (10.1) 1.5 (11.3) -0.3 (11.3)
Public pensions expenditure as % of GDP - Overall p.p. change over the 
entire projection period (starting level in brackets)
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reported the breakdown in the 2012 pension country fiches, 25 Member States did so in the 2015 
country fiches25).  
Policy-related changes are consistently reducing pension expenditure, with the largest cumulated 
impact on pension expenditure between 2009 and 2015. The change in the underlying assumptions had 
an expenditure-increasing impact between 2009 and 2012, and an expenditure-decreasing impact 
between 2012 and 2015. The improvements in modelling have first produced an expenditure-
increasing impact, which then turned to a decreasing impact between the 2012 and 2015 projections. 
Finally, the interpretation of 'constant policy' had an impact on pension expenditure only between the 
2009 and 2012 rounds, showing that many countries decided to change assumptions to better reflect 
historical evidence26. 
Table 15. Breakdown of the main differences in public pension projections as % of GDP at EU level 
between different projection vintages                                                            
Source: Ageing Report (2009, 2012 and 2015). 
To provide a more detailed look at the underlying drivers of changes in the pension spending-to-GDP 
ratio over time, the following decomposition formula is applied for all projection vintages: 
ܲ݁݊ݏ݅݋݊	ܧݔ݌
ܩܦܲ =
ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊	65 +
ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊	20 − 64
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
஽௘௣௘௡ௗ௘௡௖௬	ோ௔௧௜௢
∙ ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܲ݁݊ݏ݅݋݊݁ݎݏ	(ܲ݁݊ݏ݅݋݊ݏ)ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊	65 +
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
஼௢௩௘௥௔௚௘	ோ௔௧௜௢
∙ 
 
∙ ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݅݊ܿ݋݉݁	݂ݎ݋݉	݌݁݊ݏ݅݋݊ݏ	(ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	ܲ݁݊ݏ݅݋݊)ܩܦܲ
ܪ݋ݑݎݏ	ܹ݋ݎ݇݁݀	20 − 74
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
஻௘௡௘௙௜௧	ோ௔௧௜௢
∙ ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊	20 − 64ܪ݋ݑݎݏ	ܹ݋ݎ݇݁݀	20 − 74
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
௅௔௕௢௨௥	ெ௔௥௞௘௧ି௅௔௕௢௨௥	௜௡௧௘௡௦௜௧௬
 
 
The equation shows the main drivers that affect the dynamics of pension expenditure. The overall 
change in the public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio can be expressed as the sum of the contribution 
of the following four main elements: 
                                                            
25 The pension country fiches are available athttp://europa.eu/epc/pdf/country_fiche_en.zip  
26 Changes to no-policy-change assumption have occurred to reflect e.g. that ad hoc changes have been made in the past 
regularly so that pensions have risen faster than the legislated pension indexing would imply. 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Change in assumptions 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Improvement in the coverage or in the modelling 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5
Change in the interpretation of constant policy 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0
Policy related changes 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
TOTAL CHANGE (2012 AR - 2009 AR) 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Change in assumptions 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 -0.3 -0.7
Improvement in the coverage or in the modelling 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Change in the interpretation of constant policy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Policy related changes 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
Others 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL CHANGE (2015 AR - 2012 AR) 0.6 0.3 0.1 -0.5 -1.1 -1.4
European Union - difference between 2015 AR and 2012 AR
European Union - difference between 2012 AR and 2009 AR
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• The dependency ratio, which quantifies the impact of demography (the change in the 
composition of the population, old age versus working age) on the pension-to-GDP ratio. An 
increase in this ratio indicates a higher proportion of older individuals with respect to 
working-age population. As the dependency ratio increases, the pension-to GDP ratio moves 
in the same direction. 
• The coverage ratio, which is defined as the number of pensioners of all ages to the 
population over 65 years. The analysis of the coverage ratio provides information about how 
changes in the effective exit age and the share of the population covered by the pension 
system influence pension spending. As the coverage ratio increases, the pension expenditure-
to-GDP ratio increases as well.  
• The benefit ratio, which indicates the development of the relative value of the average 
pension (public pension spending / number of pensioners) with respect to the average wage. 
This ratio reflects the features of the legal framework of pension systems as far as the 
calculation and indexation rules are concerned. 
• Labour market/ labour intensity, which refers to the impact of labour market behaviour on 
pension expenditure. It captures the impact of measures aiming at increasing the participation 
rate, including of older people, reflecting projected developments in the labour market.  
Table 16 shows the decomposition for all projection vintages. The dependency ratio effect has been 
consistently, by far, the most important driver of the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio, being 
moreover the only driver that pushes up the latter. The dependency ratio effect was smaller in the 2001 
and 2015 projections compared to other vintages (see also Tables 12 and 13).  
As observed in Chapter 2, several reform steps have been taken in recent years by a number of 
Member States in order to limit the increasing impact of ageing on public pension expenditure. In 
many cases, these reforms were related to the abolishment or restriction of early retirement schemes, 
the increase in statutory retirement ages or the incentive to stay longer in the labour market on a 
voluntary basis, beyond the legal retirement age. All these measures are reflected in the reduction of 
the coverage ratio (pensioners / population 65+) that reduces the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio. 
The latter has assumed an increasing importance in pushing down the increasing trend in pension 
expenditure since the 2001 projection vintage27.  
Many countries have also implemented measures that reduce the generosity of pension benefits to 
improve the sustainability of their pension systems. For example, the indexation of pensions in 
payment, the valorisation of past pensionable earnings, the way accrual rates are determined and the 
way age limits are set for a full pension are design features that impact the generosity of current and 
future pensions. In the EU as a whole, changes in the benefit ratio have shown a larger reducing effect 
on the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio since the 2009 projections28, reflecting a decreasing relative 
generosity of pension benefits. 
Labour market reforms leading to longer and active working lives improve the sustainability of 
pension systems through higher labour supply and thus faster potential GDP growth. Higher 
employment rates also increase the amount of pension contributions and if the increase occurs also in 
older age groups, it is associated with higher effective exit ages and thus shortens the time spent on 
retirement. The labour market effect has reduced the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio in all 
projection vintages, with the most pronounced impact for countries with the highest initial 
unemployment rates to be absorbed over time before reaching the assumed long-term "equilibrium" 
rate.  
                                                            
27 The coverage ratio effect for the EU as a whole is less pronounced in 2015 compared with 2012 due the fact that the high 
coverage ratio effect in 2012 was partly due to eligibility restricting reforms with an immediate impact (e.g. in Greece and 
Italy), which are not captured in the 2015 coverage ratio effect anymore.  
28 The gradual decrease in the benefit ratio effect between the 2001 and 2009 projections can also be attributed to the fact that 
part of the effects materialised in between the projections. 
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Table 16. Breakdown of the main differences in public pension projection as % of GDP at EU level               
Source: Ageing Report (2001, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015). 
 
3.3. SHORT-TERM ACCURACY OF PENSION PROJECTIONS 
The first years of projected nominal public pension expenditure should not be prone to major forecast 
errors at least in "normal" times and in absence of any major policy changes, given that the number of 
pensioners and the amount of pension benefits should be well predictable.  
At the aggregate EU level, the projected nominal pension expenditure projections until 2016 are very 
close to each other, as can be seen in Graph 23. In each projection round, the observed starting 
expenditure is also close to the projected one both in the next projection round and in subsequent 
projections. This indicates no systemic bias in the projections over the short run29.  
Graph 23. Projected public pension expenditure for the EU as whole in 2004-2016 from the 2006, 2009, 
2012 and 2015 projection exercises (nominal expenditure in millions of euros)                                                
 
Source: Ageing Report (2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015). 
Notes: Countries which participated in all projection rounds since 2006 are included: BE, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, ES, FR, IT, 
CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK
 
To measure the accuracy of the projections in the short term between consecutive projection exercises, 
the difference between the nominal pension expenditure in the base year (actual observed data) in each 
projection exercise and the nominal pension expenditure as projected in the corresponding previous 
round of projections for this year is calculated. For example, for the year 2010, the outturn value from 
the AR2012 is compared with the projected value from the AR2009 exercise. Graph 24 shows the 
                                                            
29 The 2001 projection round is excluded from this analysis as the underlying projection assumptions lead to no increase in 
the pension expenditure to GDP ratio before the year 2011. 
Overall change Dependency ratio 
contribution
Eligibility/Coverage 
ratio contribution
Benefit ratio 
contribution
Employment/Labour 
market contribution
Residual/Interaction 
effect
2001 AR 2.9 6.4 0.6 -2.8 -1.1 -0.2
2006 AR 2.2 8.5 -2.2 -2.6 -1.1 -0.4
2009 AR 2.3 8.7 -2.6 -2.5 -0.7 -0.6
2012 AR 1.5 8.5 -2.9 -2.7 -0.7 -0.6
2015 AR -0.2 7.2 -2.6 -3.0 -1.4 -0.4
Decomposition of gross public pension expenditure overall change - European Union
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distributions30 of forecast errors for pension expenditure over the whole sample of EU countries. The 
distributions are peaking at close to zero and the majority of observed biases are within a 10% 
bandwidth for all projection years, confirming that no systemic bias over the short run can be found 
when looking at the full sample of observations across EU countries.  
Graph 24. Distribution of projected biases of projected public pension expenditure (outturn – projected 
values of nominal pension expenditure) across EU Member States                                                    
 
* Bandwidth = 0.0199 
Source: Commission services.
 
The macroeconomic situation can, however, affect the accuracy of pension expenditure projections for 
individual countries even in the short term, if a large divergence between the underlying economic 
assumptions and the realised outcome occurs, especially in terms of the variables that are used to index 
pension benefits (usually inflation and wage growth). The macroeconomic context might also lead to 
pension policy measures, like temporary freezes in indexation, which can have a direct impact on the 
short-term accuracy of pension projections. Finally, the economic situation might have repercussions 
on retirement behaviour, for example when the worsening labour market situation leads to increased 
retirement in older age cohorts, leading to higher pension expenditure than originally projected.  
Also other pension policy measures (not necessarily related to the economic cycle) can affect pension 
expenditure outcomes. For instance, some countries have shifted private pensions to the public pillar, 
leading to some abrupt increases in public expenditure being observed (e.g. for Hungary in 2013). On 
the other hand, policy measures that increase retirement age or curb early retirement might lead to "a 
run for retirement" in the short term for the persons that are currently eligible to retire, leading to an 
underestimation of pension expenditure in the short term.  
Other factors that might lead to apparent "forecast errors" are changes in the coverage of the national 
pension models. A continuous strive to improve the modelling of pension expenditure has in many 
cases lead to a broader definition of public pension expenditure, which leads to an apparent 
underestimation of pension expenditure. 
As shown in Table 17, differences are present across countries, with some of them exhibiting large 
deviations between pension expenditure outcomes and the projected values in the short term. Large 
negative deviations (i.e. lower expenditure outcomes than projected) are recorded in 2007 for EE and 
CY, in 2010 for EL and in 2013 for LU, HU and RO. 
                                                            
30 To depict the distributions in the three projection exercises, an Epanechnikov kernel density estimation with the bandwidth 
reported in the graph is used. 
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Major short-term positive deviations have been also recorded for some Member States mostly before 
the beginning of the economic crisis (SK in 2007) or during the crisis (CZ, IE and LV in 2010). Only 
MT shows a very large positive deviation in 2013.  
Table 17. Forecast errors for the three first years (comparing outcome (base year) expenditure with the 
projected expenditure from the previous projection round, % of outcome expenditure)     
                                              
 
Source: Commission services. 
Table A.10 in the Annex expands the above analysis by comparing the latest outcome (2013) with the 
projected values for 2013 in the three previous projection exercises (2006, 2009 and 2012 AR). This 
analysis confirms that at the aggregate EU level there is no systemic bias in the projections in the 3 to 
9 year horizon (see also Graph 23 above), albeit large deviations are reported in several countries. 
To conclude, the methodology used in the pension projections run for the different vintages of the 
Ageing Report is consistent over time, thus facilitating a meaningful comparison of the projection 
results.  
The change in the projected pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the next half century has 
decreased since 2001 for the EU as a whole. Many countries have reported large decreases in projected 
pension expenditure due to major policy reforms. Overall, reforms have primarily led to a decrease in 
the projected coverage (e.g. through curbs in early retirement schemes and increased retirement ages) 
and to a reduction in the generosity of pension benefits (e.g. through a larger reliance on price 
indexation).  
Although the number of pensioners and the amount of pensions should be well known for the first 
years of the projections, the short-term accuracy of the pension projections can be affected by many 
factors. This can be seen in large recorded deviations for several countries when comparing the 
realised outcome with the projected nominal pension expenditure from the previous projection round. 
However, at the aggregate EU and EA level, the deviations are on average small and indicate no 
systematic bias over the first years of projections.  
2007 outcome 
(reported in 2009 
AR) vs. 2006 AR 
projection for 2007
2010 outcome 
(reported in 2012 
AR) vs. 2009 AR 
projection for 2010
2013 outcome 
(reported in 2015 
AR) vs. 2012 AR 
projection for 2013
outcome - projected outcome - projected outcome - projected
BE -1.8% 1.9% 0.9%
BG : 1.6% 6.1%
CZ 3.7% 10.6% -3.2%
DK -5.5% -3.8% -2.3%
DE -0.1% 0.0% -2.6%
EE -17.2% -2.7% 2.6%
IE 6.6% 10.8% -0.2%
EL : -12.7% -1.2%
ES -2.6% 1.8% 5.0%
FR 3.5% -4.5% 4.8%
IT -0.4% 0.7% -1.9%
CY -20.3% 4.2% 4.6%
LV -4.8% 30.6% 6.0%
LT 7.0% -0.1% 1.1%
LU -3.1% -1.0% -14.8%
HU -1.8% -0.1% -15.3%
MT -2.3% 7.4% 10.2%
NL -5.7% 1.1% -1.8%
AT -0.2% 3.6% -1.5%
PL -5.3% 3.0% -5.5%
PT 1.7% 2.3% 1.4%
RO : -2.4% -16.0%
SI -3.9% -1.4% -9.7%
SK 12.0% 5.3% -3.7%
FI -0.6% -1.9% -0.4%
SE 0.1% -7.5% 4.2%
UK 0.9% 2.7% 6.1%
NO : -0.6% -0.3%
EU 1.3% -0.3% 0.9%
EA 1.7% -0.7% 0.6%
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4. THE IMPACT OF PENSION REFORMS ON THE 
FINANCIAL BALANCE OF PENSION SYSTEMS AND THE 
ADEQUACY OF PENSIONS  
4.1. THE FINANCIAL BALANCE OF PENSION SYSTEMS AFTER A DECADE OF REFORMS 
This chapter investigates whether recent pension reforms have improved the financial stability of 
pension schemes around the EU. The analysis makes use of a financial gap indicator (FGI) calculated 
with the pension projections contained in the Ageing Reports.  
For all PAYG schemes, even when the formula for calculating pension rights is not a DB but a DC one 
as in the case of a NDC pension scheme, the basic financial equilibrium condition can be expressed as 
follows31: 
Cത୲ ∗ Cont୲ 	= 	Pഥ୲ ∗ Pens୲                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Where, Cത୲ is the average contribution in any given period t, Cont୲ is the number of contributors in any 
given period t, Pഥ୲	 is the average pension in any given period t and Pens୲ is the number of pensioners in 
any given period t. 
Starting from the condition above a Financial Gap Indicator (FGI) can be easily calculated as follow:  
 
FGI = 	 େഥ౪୔ഥ౪ ∗
େ୭୬୲౪
୔ୣ୬ୱ౪ − 1 = FRതതതത୲ ∗ DRതതതത୲ − 1                                                                                                  (2) 
 
where FR is the Financial Ratio (FR: the average contribution to the average pension at time t) and DR 
is the Demographic Ratio (DR: the ratio of the number of contributors to the number of pensioners in a 
given period t). 
According to the FGI indicator, a pension system is in financial equilibrium when the FGI is equal to 
0; an emerging financial dis-equilibrium or deficit would be signalled by a value smaller than 0 and, 
vice versa, a surplus would be present whenever the FGI is larger than 0. Equation (2) makes evident 
that the financial stability of a pension scheme is the result of the evolution of the two main 
components: the Financial Ratio (FR), and the Demographic Ratio (DR). 32 In order to improve the 
financial stability of the pension scheme, policymakers can adjust one of the following channels: 
increase revenue by changing the contribution (rates or base), decrease expenditure by reforming the 
rules to determine the pension level and change the requirements to retire, e.g. retirement age,  and the 
contribution requirement to increase the effective retirement age. 
In order to get a better view of the financial situation of a PAYG pension scheme, it would be better   
to separate earnings-related pensions from social assistance. Due to data availability, this has been 
possible only for the FGI from the 2012 AR and 2015 AR. The analysis below covers pension figures 
on public pension schemes. The aggregate of public pension expenditure may include benefits that are 
not necessarily earnings-related. Disability pension, minimum pension or flat component of an 
earnings-related old-age pension may, according to national legislation, be tax financed. Therefore, 
                                                            
31 For the sake of simplicity we are not considering here the possibility of buffer funds as in the case of the Swedish system. 
32 By adopting the terminology of Drouin A. and M. Cichon (2009). 
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DK and NL public pension schemes, based on years of residency, have been excluded from the 
analysis. 33 
Revenues from contribution and the number of contributors to the public pension scheme are part of 
the AWG exercise since the 2006 round of projections.34  Hence, the analysis proposed in this section 
will rely on data from the 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015 AR.  
Each group of columns in the table below shows the evolution of the FGI between 2015 and the final 
year of the interval covered by the projection exercise of each AR (2050 in the 2006 AR and 2060 for 
all sub-sequent reports).  
Table 18. FGI evolution throughout the different AR vintages 
                                              
Notes: UK not included because of data availability. NL and DK not included as public pension system is based on 
year of residence instead of contribution. BE and NO not included because employees and employers contribution 
are not directly linked to financing of public pension expenditures, but – similar to other taxes - used to finance 
government expenditures in general. Data on contribution for BG related to the 2009 AR and 2012 AR include State 
contribution. Revenues from contribution in the case of SE do not include the buffer fund. Data for PL refer to the 
FUCS pension scheme. Data for IE include State pensions and the non-funded private occupational public service 
pension (POPS). It should be noted that in IE employer and employee contributions for state pensions are used to 
fund a wide range of social insurance benefits. Contribution figures for ES have not been reported in 2006 AR.
Source: Commission services. 
                                                            
33 Since 2012 non-earnings-related minimum pension or income guarantee expenditure and recipients have been projected 
separately in the AR. Additionally, in 2015, expenditure and recipients of disability and other pension benefit that are not 
earnings related have been projected. Coherently with the effort to separate contribution from social assistance, these figures 
have been excluded when calculating the average pension and the number of pensioners using data from the 2012 AR and 
from the 2015 AR. 
34 The total revenue from employees and employers contribution has been collected in 2006, 2009 and 2012 projection 
exercises. In 2015 the module has been updated. Employees and Employers contributions are now projected separately as 
well as State contributions. 
Country 2015 2050 Difference 
2050 - 2015
2015 2060 Difference 
2060 - 2015
2015 2060 Difference 
2060 - 2015
2015 2060 Difference 
2060 - 2015
BG -0.13 -0.35 -0.22 -0.09 -0.28 -0.18 -0.55 -0.56 -0.01
CZ 0.09 -0.37 -0.46 0.21 -0.25 -0.46 -0.03 -0.25 -0.22 -0.10 -0.19 -0.08
DE -0.34 -0.32 0.02 -0.34 -0.33 0.01 -0.34 -0.35 -0.01 -0.33 -0.34 -0.01
EE 0.09 0.46 0.37 -0.03 0.13 0.16 -0.27 -0.12 0.16 -0.30 -0.23 0.07
IE -0.43 -0.70 -0.27 0.05 -0.48 -0.53 -0.29 -0.48 -0.19 -0.29 -0.42 -0.14
EL -0.42 -0.69 -0.27 -0.26 -0.65 -0.39 -0.49 -0.47 0.03 -0.49 -0.36 0.14
ES 0.16 -0.31 -0.47 0.06 -0.19 -0.26 -0.13 -0.06 0.07
FR -0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.21 -0.24 -0.03 -0.42 -0.30 0.12
HR -0.45 -0.20 0.25
IT -0.25 -0.28 -0.03 -0.24 -0.22 0.02 -0.30 -0.25 0.05 -0.31 -0.21 0.10
CY -0.21 -0.64 -0.43 -0.44 -0.74 -0.30 -0.09 -0.36 -0.28 -0.34 -0.25 0.10
LV 0.25 -0.03 -0.27 0.25 0.14 -0.11 -0.05 0.20 0.24 0.01 0.35 0.35
LT -0.06 -0.28 -0.23 0.00 -0.44 -0.44 -0.05 -0.42 -0.37 -0.01 -0.24 -0.23
LU -0.07 -0.42 -0.35 0.08 -0.59 -0.67 -0.15 -0.53 -0.38 -0.29 -0.50 -0.21
HU -0.43 -0.60 -0.18 -0.20 -0.38 -0.18 -0.15 -0.33 -0.17 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06
MT -0.34 -0.53 -0.18 -0.34 -0.57 -0.23 -0.06 -0.47 -0.41 -0.45 -0.60 -0.15
AT -0.29 -0.30 -0.01 -0.30 -0.33 -0.04 -0.41 -0.47 -0.06 -0.40 -0.42 -0.03
PL -0.17 -0.01 0.17 -0.42 -0.42 -0.01 -0.28 -0.21 0.07 -0.30 -0.29 0.01
PT -0.22 -0.56 -0.34 -0.17 -0.36 -0.20 -0.15 -0.32 -0.17 -0.19 -0.14 0.06
RO -0.28 -0.55 -0.26 -0.19 0.01 0.20 -0.25 -0.19 0.07
SI -0.10 -0.42 -0.32 -0.21 -0.54 -0.33 -0.19 -0.47 -0.28 -0.24 -0.43 -0.19
SK -0.25 -0.51 -0.25 -0.25 -0.59 -0.33 -0.41 -0.67 -0.26 -0.29 -0.40 -0.12
FI -0.19 -0.18 0.01 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 -0.15 -0.17 -0.02 -0.50 -0.44 0.06
SE -0.28 -0.35 -0.07 -0.35 -0.36 0.00 -0.25 -0.27 -0.02 -0.30 -0.10 0.20
EU -0.18 -0.34 -0.16 -0.15 -0.37 -0.22 -0.20 -0.31 -0.11 -0.29 -0.28 0.01
FGI - 2006 AR FGI - 2009 AR FGI - 2012 AR FGI - 2015 AR
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When looking at the difference in the value of the FGI between 2015 and the end point of the 
projection horizon (2050 or 2060), the results show on average (EU values) a deteriorating trend up to 
the 2009 AR projections, followed by a sharp improvement in the two more recent rounds of 
projections. 
Indeed, while improvements in the value of the FGI are projected for only four countries in the 2006 
AR (DE, EE, PL and FI) and five countries in the 2009 AR (DE, EE, IT, FI and SE), with only EE 
showing a positive value of the indicator in 2060 in both vintages of projections, in the 2015 AR there 
are as many as 13 countries projecting an improvement in the indicator over the long run. As a result 
of the financial crisis, financial stability has deteriorated in the short term throughout the projection 
exercises. Indeed, the gap projected for 2015 turns out to be worst in the 2012 AR and 2015 AR (-0.20 
and -0.29 at EU level respectively) compared to the value projected in the 2009 AR, at the beginning 
of the crisis. When looking at the long term, many pension reforms during the last 5 years, supported 
by more favourable demographic projections (as from EUROPOP 2013 - as shown in Table 1 of 
section 1), result in better outcomes than in the past. Indeed, an FGI of -0.28 is projected for 2060 in 
the 2015 AR compared to a much higher value of -0.37 based on the 2009 AR for the same year 
(2060). However, it is to be stressed that a positive value of the indicator is projected only for LV 
(0.35) in 2060. 
In order to further investigate the evolution of the FGI throughout the last four vintages of the 
projection exercises, an analysis of the evolution of the two sub-indicators in equation 2 (FR and DR) 
is presented in Table 19. For each AR, the indicators' evolution between 2015 and the end of the 
projection horizon is reported.35 
Throughout the four last vintages of the AR, the demographic ratio (DR) behaves coherently with the 
evolution of the dependency ratio, as shown in Table 1, section 1. The reduction of the share of 
working-age population over the population aged more than 65 is reflected in the ratio between 
contributors and pensioners and impinges on the financial stability of the pension system. Coherently 
with the data on the evolution of the dependency ratio shown in Table 1, where a lower increase is 
projected in the 2015 AR, the projected DR is substantially increased in the latest report (-0.27 in the 
2015 AR, compared to more than -0.54 in the 2009 AR) as a result of: i) more favourable population 
projections; and, ii) recent legislated reforms aimed at prolonging working careers and closing 
pathways to early retirement, e.g. by linking standard retirement age to life expectancy, increasing 
contribution requirements for retirement, revising eligibility criteria for disability pensions, etc. 
The upward trend in pension expenditure brought about by adverse demographic developments is 
partially counterbalanced by pension reforms that have improved the financial ratio. At EU level, a 
positive contribution of the FR has been recorded in all AR exercises, reflecting the fact that many 
countries started reforming their pension schemes well in advance of 2006 (see table 7 section 1). The 
positive contribution of the FR to the reduction of the financial gap (FGI) has become larger in more 
recent projection exercises, as additional countries implemented pension reforms that, in most cases, 
included policy measures reducing benefits or increasing contributions (e.g. introduction of a 
sustainability factor, implementation of a less favourable indexation rule, penalties for early 
retirement). In the last round of projections, all MSs but LT, LU and SK36 show a positive contribution 
coming from the FR. 
 
 
                                                            
35 In order to have sub-indicator values that add up to the value of the FGI, a log-linearization is applied: 
log(FGI + 1)ଶ଴଺଴,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ −	 log(FGI + 1)ଶ଴ଵହ,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ 
=	 (log FRଶ଴଺଴,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ −	 log FRଶ଴ଵହ,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ	) +	(logDRଶ଴଺଴,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ −	 logDRଶ଴ଵହ,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ	)		(3) 
Where, for example, log FRଶ଴଺଴,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ	 is the logarithm of the financial ratio for 2060 as from the 2015 Ageing Report. 
36 Slovakia was slightly negative. 
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Table 19. Decomposition of the FGI evolution throughout the different AR vintages  - Log linearised 
values                                              
Notes: see the note to Table 18. Values on FGI differ from those reported in Table 18 because of the log-linearisation. 
The difference 2050 – 2015 for each indicator is calculated according to eq.(3), e.g. in the last group of column the 
difference 2050 – 2015 in the FGI indicator is calculated as log(FGI + 1)ଶ଴ହ଴,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ − log( FGI + 1)ଶ଴ଵହ,୅ୖଶ଴ଵହ  . 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Looking more closely at pension arrangements prevailing in the Member States, we compare the 
average FGI performance by distinguishing those countries that have implemented at least an 
automatic stabiliser (namely the link between standard retirement age and life expectancy), a 
sustainability factor or an automatic balancing mechanism, against those that did not.37 The last two 
stabilisers directly affect the FR by cutting the benefit in payment or by increasing the revenues into 
the system. The introduction of a link between the statutory retirement age and life expectancy affects 
the demographic ratio (DR).  
The DR is of course strongly influenced by the demographic evolution as projected by EUROSTAT. 
To explicitly address this issue, a further decomposition of the indicator is carried out: 
 
DRതതതത୲ = 	 େ୭୬୲౪୔ୣ୬ୱ౪ =
େ୭୬୲౪
௉௢௣ଵହି଺ସ೟ ∗ 	
௉௢௣଺ହା೟
௉௘௡௦೟ ∗
௉௢௣ଵହି଺ସ೟
௉௢௣଺ହା೟  (4) 
Applying the log-linearisation: 
log௧ DRതതതത୲ = ܥ݋ܴ݊௧ + ܥ݋ݒܴ௧ + ܦ݁݌ܴ௧   (5) 
                                                            
37 The classification is the one presented in Table 7 in Chapter 1. A sustainability factor is defined here as a rule that reduces 
pension benefit in line with increases in life expectancy. Coherently, all the NDC systems are classified as having embedded a 
sustainability factor. An automatic balancing mechanism is a rule that reduces the pension benefit or increases contribution to 
smooth the effect of the cycle on the financial sustainability of the system. 
Country FGI FR DR FGI FR DR FGI FR DR FGI FR DR
BG -0.29 0.21 -0.49 -0.23 0.03 -0.25 -0.02 0.14 -0.16
CZ -0.54 -0.05 -0.49 -0.48 0.02 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.10 0.13 -0.23
DE 0.04 0.48 -0.44 0.01 0.39 -0.38 -0.01 0.40 -0.41 -0.02 0.41 -0.43
EE 0.29 0.58 -0.29 0.15 0.62 -0.46 0.19 0.51 -0.32 0.09 0.45 -0.36
IE -0.63 0.01 -0.64 -0.70 -0.08 -0.62 -0.31 -0.07 -0.24 -0.21 0.33 -0.54
EL -0.61 0.09 -0.70 -0.74 -0.16 -0.58 0.05 0.57 -0.52 0.24 0.35 -0.11
ES -0.53 0.21 -0.74 -0.28 0.32 -0.60 0.08 0.45 -0.37
FR -0.12 0.20 -0.31 -0.04 0.24 -0.28 -0.04 0.22 -0.26 0.18 0.32 -0.13
HR 0.37 0.49 -0.12
IT -0.04 0.39 -0.42 0.03 0.42 -0.39 0.07 0.25 -0.17 0.14 0.16 -0.02
CY -0.78 -0.07 -0.71 -0.76 0.13 -0.88 -0.36 0.60 -0.97 0.14 0.50 -0.37
LV -0.25 0.19 -0.44 -0.09 0.66 -0.76 0.23 0.80 -0.57 0.29 0.60 -0.30
LT -0.28 0.08 -0.35 -0.58 0.11 -0.69 -0.50 -0.10 -0.39 -0.26 -0.07 -0.19
LU -0.48 -0.12 -0.35 -0.96 -0.14 -0.82 -0.60 0.16 -0.75 -0.35 -0.02 -0.33
HU -0.37 -0.09 -0.29 -0.25 0.13 -0.39 -0.23 0.15 -0.38 -0.07 0.19 -0.26
MT -0.32 -0.06 -0.27 -0.42 -0.04 -0.38 -0.58 -0.14 -0.44 -0.32 0.04 -0.36
AT -0.02 0.26 -0.27 -0.05 0.32 -0.38 -0.10 0.23 -0.33 -0.05 0.26 -0.31
PL 0.19 0.60 -0.41 -0.01 0.68 -0.69 0.10 0.83 -0.73 0.02 0.57 -0.56
PT -0.56 0.09 -0.65 -0.27 0.35 -0.62 -0.23 0.34 -0.57 0.07 0.36 -0.29
RO -0.46 -0.05 -0.40 0.22 0.41 -0.19 0.08 0.40 -0.31
SI -0.44 0.05 -0.49 -0.54 0.05 -0.59 -0.43 0.05 -0.47 -0.29 0.06 -0.35
SK -0.41 0.23 -0.65 -0.59 0.19 -0.77 -0.59 -0.14 -0.45 -0.18 -0.01 -0.17
FI 0.01 0.20 -0.19 0.01 0.25 -0.24 -0.02 0.49 -0.52 0.11 0.38 -0.27
SE -0.10 0.13 -0.23 -0.01 0.39 -0.40 -0.03 -0.42 0.39 0.26 0.07 0.18
EU -0.27 0.16 -0.43 -0.33 0.21 -0.54 -0.17 0.24 -0.41 0.01 0.27 -0.27
2006 AR 2009 AR 2012 AR 2015 AR
Difference 2050 - 2015 Difference 2060 - 2015 Difference 2060 - 2015 Difference 2060 - 2015
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where ConR୲ is the logarithm of the ratio between the number of contributors and the working-age 
population, CovR୲ is the logarithm of the ratio between the population aged more than 65 and the 
number of pensioners and DepR୲	 is logarithm of the dependency ratio. Table 20 reports log-linearised 
results for the described decomposition. Averages of the difference between the value of the indicators 
in 2015 and the end of the projection interval have been calculated by pooling together all the data of 
the different ARs. Averages have been calculated: i) for all the countries together (ALL); and ii) by 
grouping the countries according to whether their system is endowed with a link between retirement 
age and life expectancy (LE), whether a sustainability factor or an automatic balancing mechanism is 
legislated (SF or AM), in contrast with those that did not legislate any of them (No AAM). As 
expected, countries where at least one of the automatic stabilisers is in place show a better evolution of 
the FGI indicator, which is almost stable over the projection horizon (0 for countries with LE and 0.01 
for countries with SF or AM).  
Table 20. Decomposition of the FGI and its sub-indicators (pooled data from different AR) –Log linearised 
values                                              
    
Notes: Values displayed are based on log linearisation as from eq. (5) and taking the difference between the last 
year of the projection interval (2050 for AR 2006 – 2060 for AR 2009, AR 2012 and AR 2015) and the year 2015. 
LE group is made of 5 countries: CY, EL, IT, PT and SK. Countries where statutory retirement age is linked to increases in 
life expectances..  
SF or AM group is made of 9 countries. AM: DE, ES and SE. SF: FI, ES, FR, LV, PL, PT and SE. Countries in which a 
sustainability factor or an automatic balancing mechanism is in place 
No AAM is made of 11 countries: BG, CZ, EE, IE, HR, LT, HU, MT, AT, RO, SI. Countries where no automatic adjustment 
mechanism is in place. 
See notes Table 18 explaining the rationale for excluding some countries (DK, NL, BE and UK). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
While it is evident that for countries with SF or AM the result is driven, on average, by better 
outcomes in the FR (0.37 compared to 0.13), properly investigating the results for the countries with 
LE requires looking at the decomposition of the DR. When looking at the ConR୲ and at CovR୲	it is 
evident that LE is more effective (0.12 and 0.24 compared to 0.07 and 0.21) in contrasting the negative 
effect of the DepR୲	 (-0.68). 
The effect is more evident when comparing the decomposition results of the 2015 AR with those of the 
2006 AR (see Graph 25). In the latter, the dependency ratio for the countries that adopted the LE was 
in line with the one for the countries without any automatic stabiliser. The same applies to the other 
two sub-components of the DR indicator. When looking at the 2015 AR, we see that the average 
dependency ratio for the countries with LE has deteriorated (-0.76 from -0.65), but it is also partially 
counter-balanced by better positive outcomes in the ConR୲ and the CovR୲	 indicators.  
This evidence can be explained by the fact that at the time of the 2006 AR fewer countries, especially 
among those suffering from severe demographic pressure and badly performing FGI, had their pension 
systems endowed with automatic stabilisers. As a results of the reforms of the last 10 years, in 2015 
many countries are now included in the categories "LE" or "SF or AM". This explains the evolution of 
the DepR୲	 between the two reports. The improvement in the FR and in the ConR୲ and CovR୲	sub-
components of the DR shows that the automatic stabilisers are projected to be effective in improving 
the sustainability of pension systems over the coming decades. 
 
FR DR ConR  CovR  DepR   
ALL -0.18 0.23 -0.41 0.07 0.20 -0.68
LE 0.00 0.33 -0.33 0.12 0.24 -0.68
SF or AM 0.01 0.37 -0.36 0.05 0.18 -0.59
No AAM -0.32 0.13 -0.45 0.07 0.21 -0.73
FGI 
DR decompositionFGI decomposition
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Graph 25. Decomposition of the FGI and its sub-indicators (2015 AR versus  2006 AR)  - Log linearised 
values                                            
Notes: Values displayed are based on log linearisation as from eq. (5) and taking the difference between the last 
year of the projection interval (2060 for the AR 2015 and 2050 for the AR 2050)  and the year 2015. 
LE group is made of 5 countries: CY, EL, IT, PT and SK. 
SF or AM group is made of 9 countries. AM: DE, ES and SE. SF: FI, ES, FR, LV, PL, PT and SE.   
No AAM is made of 11 countries: BG, CZ, EE, IE, HR, LT, HU, MT, AT, RO, SI.
Source: Commission services. 
 
4.2. ADEQUACY OF PENSION SYSTEMS AFTER A DECADE OF REFORMS 
In recent years, as shown in the previous section, many countries have implemented pension reforms 
that have strengthened the financial sustainability of pension systems by tightening eligibility and 
decreasing benefits. This has led to sizable decreases in the projected pension generosity over the 
coming decades, which may also result in social or political sustainability challenges.  
Arriving at a precise definition of pension adequacy and operationalising it into an indicator has 
proven to be difficult. Besides the idea that that pension adequacy is determined by the degree of 
poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing a system provides to the current pensioner generation, 
intergenerational comparisons of adequacy also play a role, particularly in the wake of substantial 
reforms. In the following, the adequacy/generosity of the pension system is investigated using the 
benefit ratio indicator as projected by the Member States in the 2015 AR (see Graph 26 and table A.8 
in the Annex).38 Changes in benefit ratios over time capture the likely development of the relative 
value of the average pension (total public pension spending divided by number of pensioners) relative 
to the likely evolution of the average wage (economy-wide average wage). All other things constant, a 
decline in the benefit ratio over time points to a fall in the generosity of public pensions, relative to 
wages. The projected reduction in the Benefit Ratio is expected to contribute to improving public 
finances but it could also risk increasing poverty among older people in the future. 
                                                            
38 Arriving at a precise definition of pension adequacy and operationalising it into an indicator has proven to be difficult. The 
most economically accurate measure would be one comparing someone’s consumption pre-retirement with that post-
retirement. The proposed indicators approximate the optimal one by measuring how pension benefits on average compare 
with previous average income. See the 2015 Pension Adequacy Report for a detailed discussion.  
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A rather substantial decline is projected in the public pension benefit ratio for most Member States 
over the period 2013 to 2060, amounting to around -20 pp or more in three Member States (Spain, 
Portugal and Cyprus). Only Luxembourg projects a slightly increasing public benefit ratio over the 
projection horizon (+2.1 pp). A benefit ratio decrease of around -9 pp is projected at the aggregate EU 
level.  
It is nonetheless important to also consider that declines in the benefit ratio of public pensions may 
occur because the pension system has moved partly towards private schemes, and thus both revenues 
and expenditures related to public pension schemes would be lower in the future. The decline in the 
total pension benefit ratio becomes smaller in five Member States (Estonia, Latvia, Portugal, Romania 
and Sweden), when the influence of occupational and private individual schemes on pension 
entitlements is also taken into consideration. The total benefit ratio still declines by 10 pp or more in 
Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. Only Denmark and Lithuania report a slight increase in the 
total benefit ratio (by +2.1 pp. and +2.8 pp. respectively), see Table A.8 in the Annex. 
By 2060, the EU aggregate benefit ratio (for public pensions) would reach close to 38% (against 47% 
in 2013 – weighted average). The highest levels would be recorded in Luxembourg (53.4%), Greece 
(51.7%)39 and Italy (50.7%), whilst the lowest levels would be observed in Latvia (13.2%), Croatia 
(17.6%) and Estonia (18.8%). In Latvia and Estonia, which also report data on occupational and 
private individual pensions, the total benefit ratio would however be slightly higher (at 19.5% and 
25.4% respectively). 
Graph 26. Benefit ratio (average public pension/wage), 2013 and 2060 
Source: Commission services. 
The benefit ratio is highly influenced by the indexation rules applied to the pension in payment. An 
indexation rule that is lower than wage indexation (i.e. price indexation rule) reduces the pension 
benefit of an individual relative to the average earning as the latter increases. This may pose a risk of 
pension inadequacy over time, especially when such a rule is applied to minimum pensions and when 
people are expecting to live on their pensions for an increasing number of years. Indeed, the projected 
average reduction in the benefit ratio in countries where pensions are indexed to wages is 6.5 pp, while 
less generous pension indexations, like those resulting in partial wage indexation or price indexation, 
lead to a much higher benefit ratio reduction in the considered time interval (10 pp and 11.2 pp 
respectively). Indexing minimum/social pension to prices instead of wages is extremely problematic in 
itself, as minimum pensions are a social tool to prevent absolute and relative poverty of people at old 
age and de-facto such indexation has proved to be "time-inconsistent" with this ultimate objective.  
Indeed, many countries have revised from time to time, on an ad-hoc basis, the level of their minimum 
pension when they are no longer able to provide a decent income support. 
                                                            
39 Please note that data on Greece refer to the situation before the 2016 reform. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS: POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS 
REMAINING CHALLENGES  
5.1. EVOLVING POLICY CHALLENGES 
In the previous chapters, progress with pension reforms has been analysed. Public pension expenditure 
as a share of GDP reached 11 ¼ % in the EU in 2013 and is projected to fall to about 11% of GDP by 
2060, i.e. no projected increase over the long term. Compared with previous long-term projection 
exercises, this is a significant improvement for future pension spending trends (see section 3). 
Nonetheless, the impact of ageing on pension spending is still projected to be substantial in some EU 
countries (see Graph 27). Large increases are projected for Luxembourg, Slovenia and Malta. 
Moreover, there are often long phasing-in periods of the pension reforms, an issue that raises questions 
about the intergenerational fairness of the reforms and poses some doubt on the time-consistency of 
their implementation. This is also leading to continued increase in pension expenditure over the next 
two decades in several countries (see Graph 28). This may call for future action to speed up the 
implementation of reforms, especially in countries with high fiscal sustainability risk in the short to 
medium term. 
Graph 27. Pension expenditure in EU countries,    Graph 28: Pension-to-GDP ratio                    
2013 and 2060 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2015) 
 
Dynamic retirement ages are becoming the norm in EU countries. A tightening of the age eligibility to 
receiving a public pension (higher retirement age, reduced access to early retirement) is expected to act 
as a constraint on public pension expenditure in nearly every Member State. This reflects implemented 
pension reforms, often phased in over a long period, that lead to higher participation rates of older 
workers during the projection period. This is the main reason for the encouraging projections in the 
very long term. Many recent pension reforms include automatic mechanisms to address increases in 
life expectancy over time (see Tables 7 and 8).  
With these sustainability-enhancing pension reforms in place in a majority of Member States, the 
challenge can take new forms. In addition to higher retirement ages, there has in general been a 
reduction of relative generosity of public pension schemes, often phased in over long time periods. 
This has reduced the expenditure-increasing effects of demographic change in the long term. But to 
make sure that these reforms will enjoy lasting support and success, other reforms are likely to be 
necessary. For example, reforms boosting retirement incomes by extending working lives and 
providing other means of retirement incomes. The relatively quick transition to an older population (in 
terms of the median age of voters) is still in its early phase in the EU. However, the window of 
opportunity is closing fast, and establishing a dynamic view on the age at which people retire needs to 
be seized without further delay. 
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Reforms have led to public pension benefits rising slower than wages, implying that on average 
pensioners will experience a relative deterioration in living standards vis-à-vis workers in the future. If 
pensions are being perceived as being 'too low' or the retirement age 'too high', this could eventually 
result in changes in pension policies, leading to upward pressure on pension spending, and the 
projections could thus underestimate future government expenditure. For example, as shown in section 
4, the public pension benefit ratio (i.e. average pension in relation to average wage) is projected to fall 
in all Member States (except Luxembourg) in the period to 2060, on average by 9 pp. in the EU and in 
some countries (CY, PT and ES) by up to 20 pp. Consequently, the benefit ratio at the end of the 
projection period is generally low. Even including private pensions, the benefit ratio in 2060 would 
settle above 50 percent in only few countries (DK, EL, IT, LU, NL), while it falls below 30 percent in 
some other cases (BG, EE, HR, LV, PL, RO). This trend however differs widely across the EU (see 
Table A.8 in the Annex).  
Pension policies have also been adapted to the changes in longevity in the EU, but adaptation is 
uneven across countries. Statutory retirement ages are increasing on average over time in EU counties. 
However, the increase is uneven, and the variability is increasing over time (see Graphs 5 and 62). 
This reflects the fact that in most countries, the statutory retirement age is constant after 2040, while in 
others it is increasing (e.g. Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, where it is linked to life expectancy). 
 
5.2. POLICIES TO ADDRESS FUTURE CHALLENGES TO PENSION SYSTEMS 
Pension reforms should be complemented by flanking policies in order to render reformed pension 
systems more acceptable, socially viable and durable. Specifically, policies should aim at: 
i. boosting retirement incomes by extending working lives;  
ii. addressing longevity risks through automatic adjustment mechanisms;  
iii. providing other complementary means of retirement incomes, e.g. through additional pension 
pillars; 
iv. pursuing time-consistent measures and avoid risk of reform reversals when faced with ageing 
median voters. 
i) extending working lives 
Extending working lives may yield a double dividend:  
• higher living standards through a longer career and a higher accumulation of pension rights, 
leading to higher permanent incomes; and,  
• further progress towards sustainable public finances. 
Extending working lives entails appropriate and comprehensive "flanking" labour market policies 
enabling older workers to continue working. These policies should combine: 
• comprehensive lifelong learning strategies; 
• flexible working arrangements that allow people to keep working beyond current formal 
“retirement ages” and to step down gradually from full-time to part-time to very part-time 
work40; 
• effective policies to help the unemployed re-enter the labour market; 
                                                            
40 See "Interview with Lord Adair Turner", in The Journal of the Economics of Ageing Volume 6, December 2015, Pages 1–4. 
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• modern social safety net systems that support those in need and provide incentives for labour 
market integration; 
• the improvement of wage-setting frameworks so that real wages and productivity 
developments are properly aligned over time;  
• measures to reduce the gender gap in employment rates, particularly wide in several Member 
States (e.g. through care facilities). 
ii) addressing longevity risk through automatic adjustment mechanisms  
Designing key pension system parameters to adjust automatically to changes in demographic prospects 
is a powerful way of strengthening pension systems and reduces the political cost of revising the 
system from time to time to cope with longevity risk. Indexing the level of annual benefits or the 
duration of time spent in retirement to the demographic pressure will contribute to the long-term 
sustainability of pension systems, without the need to intervene with new reforms every time 
demographic conditions changes (which may become increasingly challenging given the expected 
relatively rapid ageing of the median voter in the EU over the coming 25 years). 
For countries that have not yet done so, the introduction of automatic pension adjustment mechanisms 
should be favoured as a way to cater for the massive but slow-moving increases in life expectancy in 
the future and to enhance the resilience of pension systems to adverse shocks. Such a promising 
avenue has been already explored by several countries. It entails, for example, linking the retirement 
age to gains in life expectancy, or introducing a sustainability factor in DB systems, according to 
which the pension benefit is adjusted to reflect changes in life expectancy (something that is already 
automatically embedded in NDC systems). 
iii) supporting complementary retirement savings 
Though challenging in the present economic41 and fiscal climate, encouraging complementary private 
pension pillars can yield a double dividend: i) supporting retirement incomes, through a higher 
accumulation of non-public pension rights, and ii) providing, to some extent, a buffer against adverse 
shocks, by diversifying pensioners' sources of income.42 Such policies should be put into place 
sufficiently early as the build-up of supplementary savings takes time.  
Additional pensions from private pillars, to compensate for the relatively lower pension income from 
public sources, are expected in a number of Member States. Indeed, a number of countries have 
implemented systemic pension reforms, shifting part of the previously public pillar to a mandatory 
funded private pillar (EE, LV, HU, PL, SK and SE). At present, these private pillars are making very 
small disbursements since they have been set up mainly during the previous decade, but their 
importance will increase in the future. Some countries (e.g. SE, DK and NL) also rely, to a certain 
extent, on 2nd pillar occupational pensions. Also, 3rd pillar non-mandatory pension schemes are 
increasingly being introduced, but their importance is generally small (see Table A.9 in the Annex).43  
iv) pursuing time-consistent policies and avoiding risk of reform reversals when faced with ageing 
median voters 
It is also important to bear in mind the political economy dimension of pension reforms. In the EU as a 
whole, the median age of male voters (aged 18 and over) rose by 5 years between 1960 and 2010, i.e. 
                                                            
41 Clearly, the current low interest rate environment encourages savings less than before. Still, from a life cycle point of view, 
and given in many cases lower publicly provided pensions in the future compared with today, there is a strong case for 
consumption smoothing through savings (delayed consumption) also on individual level.  
42 Specifically, individual pension pillars, often provided on a voluntary basis, can also best match individuals' specific 
preferences.  
43 Based on data provided by Member States. For the Ageing Report, the provision of data on private pension systems is made 
on a voluntary basis by Member States; therefore, the information is incomplete. 
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over a period of 50 years. Going forward, it is expected to rise by another 5 years by 2030. A similar 
development, but with a higher median age, is expected for females (see Graph 29). In twenty-five 
years' time, the median age is projected to have reached 52 years for men and 55 years for women (see 
Tables A.11 and A.12 for country-specific developments). 
Graph 29. Median age of persons aged 18 and over, EU   
 
Source: Eurostat 
Several studies have documented that a political context characterised by ageing voters may hinder 
reforms, including those touching upon entitlement systems.44 Older people are more likely to vote and 
increases in life expectancy entail an increase in their number, as shown above (see Graph 1 and 2 in 
Chapter 1). This implies a growing pressure on the government to provide improved state-funded 
services and benefits for older people, such as pensions. This in turn implies higher public expenditure. 
Moreover, the provision of such services might be financed through higher taxes on the young and 
working-age population, through less spending on investment, or both, thereby increasing the size of 
intergenerational transfers. The relatively quick transition to an older population (in terms of the 
median age of voters) is still in its early phase in the EU. However, the window of opportunity is 
closing fast. 
Implementation risks, related to past pension reform reversals (e.g. as regards planned increases of the 
retirement age or tightening of rules on the calculation and indexation of pension benefits) would have 
a particularly strong impact in countries projecting high increases of the old-age dependency ratio (e.g. 
Slovakia, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia and Cyprus).45 At the same time, the risk of reform reversal may 
be more pronounced in the Member States where, based on current legislation, future pensioners are 
projected to experience the strongest decreases of the benefit ratio and replacement rate (e.g. Cyprus, 
Portugal and Spain).46 More in general, in countries with expected sharp decreases in public pensions 
(relative to pre-retirement incomes), an increasing role for private pensions may not be sufficient, 
especially for low-income workers, thus a strong safety-net system is also needed to avoid the 
resurgence of old-age poverty. To conclude, in several countries, recent debates and measures adopted 
that could partially revert past enacted reforms illustrate the necessity to appropriately calibrate 
pension reforms to ensure both fiscal sustainability and social acceptability. 
                                                            
44 See e.g. Boeri et al. (2006), Bovenberg (2008), Galasso (2006), Galasso (2008) and Laine et al. (2009). 
45 See European Commission (2002), "Reform challenges facing public pension systems: the impact of certain parametric 
reforms on pension expenditure", EPC note (EPC/ECFIN/237/02). This note explores the impact of parametric reforms 
(regarding indexation, retirement age, and benefits linked to life expectancy) on pension expenditure. In particular, a change 
in the indexation of pensions by ½ pp. would have an impact on pension expenditure ratio change, over the long-run, of 
between 0.5 to 3 pp. of GDP (depending on the country-specific pension system characteristics). 
46 The benefit ratio is the ratio between average public pension benefits and the economy-wide average wage. The 
replacement rate is the ratio between the average first public pension (old-age earnings-related part) and the average wage at 
retirement. In Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, the benefit ratio is projected to decline by around 20 pp. over the period 2013-60 
(against -9.5 pp. on average in the euro area). The replacement rate is projected to decrease by more than 30 pp. in Spain, and 
close to 27 pp. in Portugal over the same period (against around -9 pp. on average in the euro area). Other income than public 
pensions (e.g. private pensions and savings) also need to be taken into account when assessing risks related to declining 
benefit ratios. 
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ANNEX - Additional graphs and tables 
 
Table A.1. (Main) pension measures legislated by country and by type since the mid-2000's 
 
     
* Introduction, suppression or merging of schemes. 
Notes: The cell is left blank if no measure has been legislated; + signals some measure(s) legislated (share in total 
pension measures for one country < EU average); ++ signals several measures legislated (share > EU average but 
lower than EU average + one standard deviation); +++ signals numerous measures legislated (share > EU average + 
one standard deviation). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
 
 
eligibility pension calculation indexation resources
BE +++ ++ +
BG + + +++ ++ ++
CZ ++ ++ + + ++
DK +++ + ++
DE ++ ++ ++
EE + + +++ +++ ++
IE ++ ++ + +++ +
EL ++ ++ + ++ ++
ES ++ ++ + +
FR ++ ++ + ++
HR + +++ +++ ++
IT ++ ++ + ++
CY ++ + + + +
LV + ++ ++ ++
LT ++ ++ ++ ++
LU +++ +++
HU ++ ++ + ++ ++
MT ++ ++ + ++
NL +++ + +
AT +++ +
PL + + + ++ +++
PT + ++ + ++ ++
RO ++ + + ++ ++
SI + +++ +++
SK ++ ++ + ++ +
FI ++ + + + ++
SE + + +++
UK ++ ++ ++ + ++
parametric measures schemes*
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Table A.2. Key parameters of pension systems in EU countries 
  
     
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pensionable earnings reference General valorisation variable(s) General indexation variable(s)
BE Full career Prices Prices and living standard
BG Full career Wages Prices and wages
CZ Full career Wages Prices and wages
DK Years of residence Not applicable Wages
DE Full career Wages Wages plus sustainability factor
EE Full career Social taxes Prices and social taxes
IE Flat rate Not applicable No fixed rule
EL Full career Price and wages Prices and GDP (max 100% prices)
ES Last 25 years Wages Index for pension revaluation
FR 25 best years (CNAVTS) Prices Prices
HR Full career Price and wages Price and wages
IT Full career GDP Prices
CY Full career Wages Prices and wages
LV Full career Contribution wage sum index Prices and wages
LT 25 best years Yearly discretionary decision Yearly discretionary decision
LU Full career Wages Prices and wages
HU Full career Wages Prices
MT 10 best of last 40 years Cost of living Prices and wages
NL Years of residence Not applicable Wages
AT 40 best years Wages Prices
PL Full career NDC 1st: Wages, NDC 2nd: GDP Prices and wages
PT Full career up to a limit of 40 years Prices Prices and GDP
RO Full career Prices and wages until 2030 Prices and wages until 2030
SI Best consecutive 24 years Wages Prices and wages
SK Full career Wages Prices and wages
FI Full career Prices and wages Prices and wages
SE Full career Wages Wages
UK Years of insurance contributions Wages Wages
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Table A.3. Pensionable earnings reference: 2006 AR versus 2015 AR  
     
Notes: In bold, when the pension reference is based on full career earnings; in green, when the reference is not 
based on full career wages, but has been extended compared to the 2006 AR. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph A.1. Average accrual rates for new pensions over the period 2010-2060 (%) 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2012, 2015). 
2006 AR 2015 AR
BE Full career Full career
BG na Full career
CZ 30 years Full career
DK Years of residence Years of residence
DE Full career Full career
EE Full career Full career
IE Flat rate Flat rate
EL 5 best years out of last 10 years (PR); last month 
(PU) Full career
ES Last 15 years Last 25 years
FR 25 best years (CNAVTS) 25 best years (CNAVTS)
HR na Full career
IT Last 5 / 10 years (old DB); full career (new 
NDC) Full career 
CY Full career Full career
LV Full career Full career
LT 25 best years 25 best years
LU Full career Full career
HU Full career Full career
MT 3 best of last 10 years 10 best of last 40 years
NL Years of residence Years of residence
AT 40 best years (as from 2028) 40 best years
PL Full career Full career
PT Full career up to a limit of 40 years Full career up to a limit of 40 years
RO na Full career
SI Best consecutive 18 years Best consecutive 24 years
SK Full career Full career 
FI Full career Full career
SE Full career Full career
UK Years of insurance contributions Years of insurance contributions
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2010 2014 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
EU average (simple average, without SF) 5 highest 2010 5 lowest 2010
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Table A.4. Valorisation rules: 2006 AR versus 2015 AR  
 
* Prices and wages in the public sector 
Notes: In bold, when the valorisation rule is based on prices only; in green (resp. red), when the rule has become less 
(resp. more) generous compared to the 2006 AR.
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 AR 2015 AR
BE prices and welfare* prices
BG na wages
CZ wages wages
DK not applicable not applicable
DE wages wages
EE wages social taxes
IE not applicable not applicable
EL wages prices and wages
ES prices wages
FR prices prices
HR na prices and wages
IT DB: prices; NDC: GDP DB: prices; NDC: GDP
CY prices and wages wages
LV prices and wages wage sum index
LT yearly discretionary decision yearly discretionary decision
LU prices and wages wages
HU wages wages
MT prices cost of living
NL not applicable not applicable
AT wages wages
PL NDC: wages NDC 1st: wages, NDC 2nd: GDP
PT wages prices
RO na prices and wages until 2030
SI wages wages
SK wages wages
FI prices and wages prices and wages
SE wages wages
UK wages wages
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Table A.5. Indexation rules compared  
 
* Prices and for the minimum. 
** Wages for the minimum 
*** Prices for the minimum 
Notes: In bold, when the indexation rule is based on prices only; in green (resp. red), when the rule has become less 
(resp. more) generous compared to the 2006 AR.
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph A.2. Number of (main) pension reforms legislated since 2009 by country 
 
Notes: In red, countries that have required macro-financial assistance. 
Source: Commission services. 
2001 AR 2006 AR 2015 AR
BE prices and living standards prices and living standards prices and living standards
BG na na prices and wages
CZ na yearly discretionary measure* prices and wages
DK wages wages wages
DE wages (net) wages + sustainability factor wages + sustainability factor
EE na prices and social taxes prices and social taxes
IE no fixed rule no fixed rule no fixed rule
EL wages + yearly discretionary measure wages + yearly discretionary measure** prices and GDP (max 100% prices)
ES prices prices index for pension revaluation
FR prices and wages prices prices
HR na na prices and wages
IT prices prices prices
CY na prices and wages prices and wages
LV na prices and wages prices and wages
LT na yearly discretionnary measure yearly discretionnary measure
LU prices and wages prices and wages prices and wages
HU na prices and wages prices
MT na prices and wages prices and wages
NL wages wages wages
AT ad hoc  basis (reflecting wages (net)) prices prices
PL na prices prices and wages
PT wages + yearly discretionary measure prices and wages prices and GDP
RO na na prices and wages until 2030
SI na wages prices and wages
SK na prices and wages prices and wages
FI prices and wages prices and wages prices and wages
SE wages wages*** wages
UK prices prices wages
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Table A.6. Measures ruled out by Constitutional courts or corrective measures adopted after 
the peak of the 2008-09 crisis  
 
* Partially ruled-out. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph A.3. Participation rate in the EU,                               Graph A.4. Participation rate in the EU, 
by age group (%), males                                                      by age group (%), females       
 
    
Source: Commission services, Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roll-back of private 
pension schemes
Increase of taxes 
on pensions
Pension cuts
Freeze in 
retirement age 
increase
Shift back to more 
generous 
indexation rule
Reduce incentives 
to contribute to 
private schemes / 
ease withdrawal of 
accumulated 
assets
BG x x
CZ x x
EL x
IT x x
LV x
LT x
PT x* x*
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Table A.7. Countries classification depending on pension reform trends 
   
* Eurostat data (2012) 
** Ageing report (2012) 
Source: Commission services. 
 
2013 2060
BE na na preserved model one pillar
FR na na preserved model one pillar
LU* 0.0 na preserved model one pillar
MT* 0.0 na preserved model one pillar
SI** 0.0 1.6 preserved model one pillar
CZ* 0.5 na preserved model one pillar
FI* 1.8 na preserved model one pillar
PT 2.0 1.5 preserved model one pillar
CY* 3.6 na preserved model one pillar
ES 5.3 6.9 preserved model one pillar
IE na na preserved model multi-pillar
DK 30.8 44.7 preserved model multi-pillar
UK* 41.4 na preserved model multi-pillar
NL 43.2 45.5 preserved model multi-pillar
EL* 0.0 na changing model nature public scheme
IT* 1.6 na changing model nature public scheme
AT* 4.5 na changing model nature public scheme
BG* 0.0 na changing model multi-pillar
RO 0.0 9.3 changing model multi-pillar
LT 0.0 12.8 changing model multi-pillar
HR 0.0 19.0 changing model multi-pillar
LV 0.0 32.2 changing model multi-pillar
EE 0.2 25.9 changing model multi-pillar
DE* 10.3 na changing model multi-pillar
SE 21.7 34.2 changing model multi-pillar
PL na na reverting model one pillar
HU** 0.0 0.6 reverting model one pillar
SK 0.2 na reverting model one pillar
Private pension expenditures 
(% total) category 1 category 2
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Table A.8. Benefit ratio in 2013 and 2060 (in %) – 2015 AR 
 
Notes: Public pensions aggregate includes disability, survivor and non-earnings-related benefits. All pension 
aggregate includes private occupational and private individual benefit and it is only reported when private pensions 
have been provided.  
The ‘Benefit ratio’ is the average benefit of public pensions and public and private pensions, respectively, as a share 
of the economy-wide average wage (gross wages and salaries in relation to employees), as calculated by the 
Commission services. EU figures are calculated as a weighted average. 
IE A price and wage indexation rule has been assumed in the projections. 
LU Indexation rule is wages if sufficient financial resources available, otherwise only cost of living indexation 
UK Triple-lock indexation (highest of average earnings, CPI or 2.5%) is a commitment of the current government, but is 
not enshrined in law. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Country 2013 2060 % change 2013 2060 % change General indexation variable(s)
BE 42.5 41.8 -0.7 Prices and living standard
BG 34.2 27.5 -6.7 Prices and wages
CZ 42.8 39.5 -3.3 Prices and wages
DK 42.5 35.1 -7.4 61.5 63.5 2.1 Wages
DE 44.6 37.3 -7.4 Wages plus sustainability factor
EE 30.4 18.8 -11.6 30.5 25.4 -5.1 Prices and social taxes
IE 27.9 26.1 -1.8 No fixed rule
EL 65.6 51.7 -14.0 Prices and GDP (max 100% prices)
ES 59.7 39.8 -19.9 Index for pension revaluation
FR 51.3 38.9 -12.4 Prices
HR 30.8 17.6 -13.2 Wages
IT 58.8 50.7 -8.1 Prices
CY 64.4 43.5 -20.9 Prices and wages
LV 27.7 13.2 -14.5 27.7 19.5 -8.2 Prices and wages
LT 35.1 33.0 -2.1 35.1 37.9 2.8 Yearly discretionary decision
LU 51.3 53.4 2.1 Wages
HU 40.8 31.9 -8.9 Prices
MT 48.3 44.1 -4.2 Prices and wages
NL 35.9 34.2 -1.7 63.2 62.8 -0.4 Wages
AT 41.2 37.0 -4.1 Prices
PL 47.9 29.4 -18.5 47.9 29.4 -18.5 Prices and wages
PT 61.8 41.7 -20.0 62.1 42.4 -19.6 Prices and GDP
RO 37.0 23.4 -13.6 37.0 25.8 -11.2 Prices and wages until 2030
SI 33.8 30.2 -3.6 Prices and wages
SK 45.7 33.3 -12.4 Prices and wages
FI 52.1 43.8 -8.3 Prices and wages
SE 42.1 26.3 -15.8 53.8 39.9 -13.8 Wages
UK 36.4 33.9 -2.5 Prices, wages and GDP
EU 46.9 37.8 -9.0
Public pensions All pensions
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Table A.9. Private (occupational and individual) pension schemes expenditure in 2013 and 
2060 
 
Notes: The table only presents the countries which provided data for private pension schemes.  
Source: Ageing Report (2015), Commission services. 
 
 
Graph A.5. Public pension expenditure as a share of GDP in the 2001, 2009, 2012 and 2015 
vintages, European Union. 
 
Source: Ageing Report (2001, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
Country 2013 2060 2013 2060
DK 4.6 5.8 30.8 44.7
EE 0.0 2.2 0.2 25.9
ES 0.7 0.8 5.3 6.9
HR 0.0 1.6 0.0 19.0
LV 0.0 2.2 0.0 32.2
LT 0.0 1.1 0.0 12.8
NL 5.2 6.5 43.2 45.5
PT 0.3 0.2 2.0 1.5
RO 0.0 0.8 0.0 9.3
SE 2.5 3.9 21.7 34.2
% total pension expenditure% GDP
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Table A.10. Forecast errors for three, six and nine years (comparing outcome (base year) 
expenditure in 2013 as reported in 2015 AR  with the projected expenditure from the previous 
projection rounds (2006, 2009 and 2012 ARs) , % of outcome expenditure) 
 
Source: Commission services. 
2013 outcome 
(reported in  2015 
AR) vs. 2006 AR 
projection for 2013
2013 outcome 
(reported in 2015 
AR) vs. 2009 AR 
projection for 2013 
2013 outcome 
(reported in  2015 
AR) vs. 2012 AR 
projection for 2013 
outcome - projected outcome - projected outcome - projected
BE 4.6% 4.1% 0.9%
BG : -0.6% 6.1%
CZ 7.6% 8.9% -3.2%
DK -15.1% -9.2% -2.3%
DE -5.9% -4.0% -2.6%
EE -0.1% -14.9% 2.6%
IE -0.4% 2.5% -0.2%
EL : -17.3% -1.2%
ES 10.2% 4.9% 5.0%
FR 6.7% 2.8% 4.8%
IT -0.5% -1.5% -1.9%
CY -8.6% 8.0% 4.6%
LV 15.7% 20.0% 6.0%
LT -16.7% -16.7% 1.1%
LU -20.5% -17.4% -14.8%
HU -21.5% -6.2% -15.3%
MT 10.5% 10.8% 10.2%
NL -13.6% -4.8% -1.8%
AT 5.1% 2.7% -1.5%
PL 9.8% 8.4% -5.5%
PT 2.7% 2.8% 1.4%
RO : -28.0% -16.0%
SI -11.0% -12.4% -9.7%
SK 17.0% 3.6% -3.7%
FI 0.0% -4.5% -0.4%
SE -15.5% -11.7% 4.2%
UK 5.5% 5.9% 6.1%
NO : 7.3% -0.3%
EU 1.9% 0.1% 0.9%
EA 2.3% -0.5% 0.6%
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Table A.11. Median age of persons aged 18 and over, males 
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Table A.12. Median age of persons aged 18 and over, females 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
BE 44 43 42 42 44 46 48 48 48 49 49 50 51
BG 39 41 43 44 44 46 48 51 53 55 53 54 54
CZ 44 42 41 42 43 44 47 50 52 52 51 52 52
DK 44 43 42 42 44 46 48 49 49 50 50 51 52
DE 44 41 41 42 44 47 51 53 54 55 55 55 55
EE 37 38 40 40 42 43 46 49 51 52 51 52 52
IE : : : 40 41 41 46 49 47 46 47 47 47
EL : 42 44 44 44 45 49 52 55 55 54 54 54
ES : : 42 41 42 44 49 52 55 53 52 52 52
FR : : : : 44 46 48 49 49 49 50 50 51
HR : : : : : 46 48 50 51 52 53 53 54
IT 39 41 42 43 44 47 50 52 52 53 54 54 55
CY : : : : 42 43 44 47 50 51 50 51 51
LV : 39 40 41 42 43 47 49 51 49 48 49 48
LT : 39 40 39 41 44 48 51 50 48 46 47 46
LU : : 42 41 43 44 45 45 46 47 49 50 51
HU 41 42 42 42 43 43 46 49 51 52 53 53 53
MT : : 36 40 43 46 47 49 51 52 52 52 52
NL 41 40 39 40 43 46 49 51 51 51 52 52 53
AT 45 42 41 41 42 46 49 50 51 52 53 53 54
PL 37 39 38 39 42 43 45 48 52 54 54 55 55
PT 39 41 42 42 43 45 49 52 54 55 56 56 57
RO : 39 41 41 42 44 46 49 51 52 52 52 53
SI : : : 40 42 45 48 51 53 53 52 52 52
SK 38 40 39 39 40 42 45 49 52 55 56 57 58
FI 39 39 39 41 45 47 49 49 50 50 51 52 52
SE 45 45 44 44 46 46 48 48 49 49 50 50 51
UK : : 43 42 44 45 48 48 49 50 50 50 51
Males - Median age - Age 18 and over
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
BE 47 46 46 45 47 48 50 50 50 51 51 52 53
BG 39 42 45 46 47 50 52 54 56 58 57 57 56
CZ 46 45 45 44 46 47 50 53 54 55 54 54 54
DK 45 45 45 45 46 48 50 51 51 52 52 53 53
DE 46 47 47 47 47 49 53 56 57 58 58 58 58
EE 44 44 45 46 48 49 53 55 56 58 56 56 56
IE : : : 41 42 42 47 50 53 50 50 50 49
EL : 43 45 46 46 48 51 55 58 59 58 57 56
ES : : 44 44 45 46 51 55 58 59 55 55 54
FR : : : : 46 48 51 52 53 53 53 53 53
HR : : : : : 49 52 53 55 56 56 56 57
IT 41 43 44 46 47 49 52 55 56 56 56 56 57
CY : : : : 42 43 46 50 53 54 52 52 52
LV : 44 46 47 48 49 53 56 57 58 54 53 52
LT : 42 44 44 46 49 53 58 59 58 52 50 49
LU : 45 45 44 45 45 46 46 47 49 50 51 52
HU 44 44 45 46 47 48 50 53 55 56 56 56 56
MT : : 39 42 45 48 50 52 53 55 55 54 55
NL 42 43 42 42 45 48 51 53 53 54 55 55 55
AT 47 47 47 46 46 48 51 52 53 55 55 56 56
PL 39 41 41 42 44 47 49 51 55 58 59 59 59
PT 40 43 44 44 45 47 52 55 59 60 60 61 60
RO : 41 43 43 44 48 50 53 55 56 56 55 55
SI : : : 43 45 48 52 54 56 57 55 55 55
SK 40 42 41 42 43 45 48 51 55 58 60 60 61
FI 43 43 43 44 47 50 52 52 52 53 53 54 55
SE 46 47 47 46 48 49 50 50 50 51 51 52 53
UK : : 46 44 45 46 49 50 51 52 52 52 53
Females - Median age - Age 18 and over
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